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I. INTRODUCTION
PRACTITIONERS OF WHAT is loosely called "avia-
tion law" are sometimes hard-pressed to define the
subject or to circumscribe the limits of the field. Some
issues, such as those arising under the Warsaw Conven-
tion,' are clearly issues of aviation law. Others, however,
are not as obvious. Thus, lawyers representing air carri-
ers in discrimination suits brought pursuant to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 may be called labor law-
yers or aviation lawyers, depending upon who makes the
characterization.
For purposes of dividing the subject matter, this author
distinguishes between "pure aviation law," "developed
aviation law," and the "twilight zone." The first classifica-
tion embraces those legal issues which belong exclusively
in the realm of aviation, such as the Warsaw Convention,
the Chicago Convention,3 aerial hijacking, and compli-
ance with Federal Aviation Act 4 and Federal Aviation Reg-
ulations. 5 "Developed aviation law" refers to that branch
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.I.A.S.
No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Warsaw Convention].
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
- Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944,
61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
4 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1308 (1982).
5 See generally 14 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1262.310 (1985-86).
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of aviation law derived from other areas of the law which
has undergone specific development in the aviation con-
text. The field of aviation insurance is a good example.
The third category involves those legal issues which are
difficult, if not impossible, to characterize as belonging
within the field of aviation law. Examples of these include
labor problems, constitutional issues, and antitrust issues
affecting aviation operations.
The preceding discussion illustrates the difficulty in at-
tempting to report on recent developments in aviation
case law. In many respects, what should be included
within this survey depends on the leanings of those who
review it. To discuss every decision of interest to all law-
yers involved in cases with aviation elements would be im-
possible. The cases discussed hereunder have been
selected primarily for their interest to lawyers involved in
the liability aspects of aviation litigation.
II. JURISDICTION
A. Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The question of subject matter jurisdiction in the fed-
eral courts is an important issue in aviation cases. Foreign
defendants, in particular, nearly always prefer that litiga-
tion against them proceed in a federal court. Federal
judges are usually of a higher caliber than state court
judges; therefore, the standard of practice is usually
higher in the federal courts. In addition, federal judges
are invariably more experienced in international issues,
such as the interpretation of treaties, that may arise in a
dispute involving a foreign defendant.
An increasingly important aspect of federal subject mat-
ter jurisdiction is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976.6 Congress introduced this Act to provide a com-
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611
(1982). For a detailed discussion of this Act in the context of air carriers owned
by foreign states, see Young, Defending Litigation Against a Foreign Airline Under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 51 J. AIR L. & COM. 461 (1986).
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prehensive scheme under which actions could be brought
in United States courts against "foreign states." 7 A "for-
eign state" is defined to include a foreign corporation, the
majority of whose shares are owned by the government of
the state in which the corporation is organized.8
A significant provision in the Act allows the removal to
federal court of "[a]ny civil action brought in a state court
against a foreign state."9 The United States Supreme
Court has held that the language of the Act is wide
enough to permit the removal to federal court of any ac-
tion against a foreign state, even if the plaintiff is an alien,
although there may be no diversity of citizenship or fed-
eral question jurisdiction.10 An important consequence of
removal under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is
that the case will be tried by a judge sitting without a
jury.,'
Under the Act, foreign states may be sued in the United
States only when the action fits within specified excep-
tions to sovereign immunity, the most important of which
is the "commercial activity" exception.1 2 According to
this exception, a court in the United States may exercise
jurisdiction over foreign states in any case where the ac-
tion is based upon a "commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act per-
formed in the United States in connection with a commer-
cial activity of a foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
committed outside of the territory of the United States in
connection with commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere which causes a direct effect in the United
States."'"
A number of important decisions on the Foreign Sover-
7 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6604.
8 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a), (b)(2) (1982).
I d. § 1441(d).
10 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 490-91 (1983).
,, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1982).
12 Id. § 1605(a)(2).
Is Id. The latter exception is also known as the "direct effect" exception.
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eign Immunities Act are directly relevant to the aviation
field. In Australian Government Aircraft Factories v. Lynne 14
the court affirmed the established principle that a foreign
sovereign is immune from suit for its public acts but not
for commercial acts causing a direct effect in the United
States. 15 Plaintiffs brought an action in the District Court
for the Central District of California against Australian
Government Aircraft Factories and the Commonwealth of
Australia alleging causes of action arising out of the July
1979 crash of one of its aircraft in Indonesia with the ac-
companying death of the American pilot. The court found
that the Australian Government did not fall within any ex-
ception to the general rule of sovereign immunity and was
thus not subject to jurisdiction in a United States court. 16
The Federal District Court for the Central District of
California recently followed the Australian Government case
in Eze v. Nigeria Airways, Ltd. 17 The court dismissed ac-
tions against Nigeria Airways, Ltd. and Rolls Royce, Ltd.,
both foreign states under the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act, arising out of the crash of a Nigeria Airways F-28
aircraft near Enugu, Nigeria on November 28, 1983.18
In Bryne v. Thai Airways International Ltd. 19 the court de-
nied a motion to dismiss a claim against a carrier that was
a foreign state under the Act on the grounds that the car-
rier conducted commercial activity in the United States by
maintaining offices, selling tickets, and operating flights
into and out of the country. Since the flight on which
plaintiff was injured originated in the United States, such
flight was connected with the carrier's commercial activity
in the United States. The court held, therefore, that the
United States could properly exercise jurisdiction under
section 1605(a)(2) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
14 743 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1189 (1985).
1 743 F.2d at 674.
16 Id. at 675.
17 Nos. 85-259, 85-676 (C.D. Cal. filed March 1985).
is Id.
1 18 Av. Cas.(CCH) 18,363 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
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In Boskoffv. The Boeing Co.2 1 the court held that the pro-
vision in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act permit-
ting the enlargement of a foreign state's time to remove
an action beyond thirty days from receipt of the initial
pleading "for cause shown" did not permit removal of an
action more than five years after receipt of such initial
pleading. The court noted that sustaining such a removal
"would enable a litigant to hazard the chances of litigation
in the state court indefinitely but to remove the action
whenever it seemed advantageous to do so. '"22
In Keller v. Transportes Aereos Militares Ecuadorianos23 the
District Court for the District of Columbia held that the
owner and operator of an aircraft, which qualified as a for-
eign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
did not waive its immunity from suit by entering into a
credit agreement with certain United States banks and
other institutions to finance the cost of the aircraft. The
aircraft crashed in Ecuador, killing two American citizens.
The court held that the crash did not relate to the agree-
ment executed in connection with the financing of the air-
craft. Further, the court held that the "commercial
activity" exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act did not apply because the crash did not cause a "di-
rect effect" in the United States. 4
In In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983 25 the
District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed sev-
eral actions against the Soviet Union based on the shoot-
ing down of Korean Air Lines flight 007 on September 1,
1983, while the aircraft was allegedly in Soviet airspace.
The court held that under the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act the Soviet Union was entitled to sovereign immu-
20 Id.
2 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,483, (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
22 Id. at 18,485. The court noted that the removal procedure was not designed
for duplication of judicial resources or delay. Id. at 18,486.
22 601 F. Supp. 787 (D.D.C. 1985).
24 Id. at 789-90.
2- 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,596 (D.D.C. 1985).
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nity and that the shooting down of the Koreanjetliner was
military and political in nature, thus falling into the cate-
gory of "governmental" acts for which sovereign immu-
nity is granted.2 6 The court also denied jurisdiction
pursuant to the Act of State doctrine, which was formu-
lated to prevent judicial interference in sensitive areas of
foreign relations. 7
Beattie v. United States 28 is one of several cases arising out
of the crash of an Air New Zealand aircraft into Mount
Erebus, Antarctica on November 28, 1979. Plaintiff filed a
complaint in the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia seeking recovery against the United States for wrong-
ful death under the Federal Tort Claims Act 9.2  The
complaint alleged negligence on the part of the United
States Navy air traffic controllers at McMurdo Naval Air
Station, Antarctica, as well as negligence by officials of the
Department of Defense in the selection, training, and su-
pervision of the Navy personnel at the air base facility.3 °
The Government filed a motion to dismiss, claiming,
among other things, that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. The Government's motion was based
on the "foreign country" exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act. This exception removes from the scope of the
Federal Tort Claims Act "any claim arising in a foreign
country." 3 1
The district court was faced with a case of first impres-
sion which required it to determine whether Antarctica
was a "foreign country" within the meaning of the Federal
Tort Claims Act. The district court found that Antarctica
was not subject to the sovereignty of any nation and,
26 Id. at 17,600-01.
27 Id.
28 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
2 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1982). The Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act authorizes suits against the government for damages caused
by the negligence of a government employee while acting within the scope of his
employment. Id. § 1346(b).
so 756 F.2d at 93.
51 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1982).
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therefore, was not a "foreign country. '3 2 Consequently,
the court denied the government's motion to dismiss."
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia af-
firmed the district court's finding that Antarctica was not a
"foreign country" and had no civil tort law to apply.34
Furthermore, since some of the alleged negligence oc-
curred in government headquarters located in Washing-
ton, D.C., jurisdiction was proper in the district court.35
B. Personal Jurisdiction
In a recent non-aviation case, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court, 6 the California Supreme Court ruled that
the State of California may constitutionally exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over a component parts manufacturer
that made no direct sales in California but knew that a
substantial number of its parts would be incorporated
into finished products sold in that state.3 7 The signifi-
cance of this decision for foreign aircraft component part
manufacturers cannot be underestimated.
Asahi arose in the context of a 1978 Honda motorcycle
accident in California. The driver of the motorcycle was
severely injured when he lost control of his motorcycle
and collided with a tractor rig. His wife, a passenger on
the motorcycle, was killed. The accident allegedly was
caused by a sudden loss of air and an explosion in the
motorcycle's rear . tire. 8
The surviving driver filed a products liability action al-
leging that the motorcycle tire, tube and sealant were de-
fective. Among those named as defendants in the
complaint were the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube
and the California retailer. The California retailer in turn
-2 Beattie v. United States, 592 F. Supp. 780, 781 (D.D.C. 1984).
- Id. at 785.
-4 756 F.2d at 94, 104-05.
,s Id. at 100.
-6 39 Cal. 3d 35, 702 P.2d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385, cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1258
(1986).
37 Id. at 44-48, 702 P.2d at 549-50, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
-- Id. at 40-41, 702 P.2d at 545, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
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filed a cross-complaint, seeking indemnity from its co-de-
fendants and from Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., the
manufacturer of the tube's valve assembly. Asahi moved
to quash service of summons, arguing that it could not be
subject to personal jurisdiction in California because it
lacked the requisite "minimum contacts" with the state.39
After the lower court denied the motion, Asahi appealed
to the California Supreme Court,40 which ruled that per-
sonal jurisdiction over Asahi was proper under the deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington 4' and World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson 42
In this case, Asahi had no offices, property or agents in
California. It solicited no business in California and made
no direct sales there. The California Supreme Court
nonetheless found that jurisdiction could be exercised
over Asahi, relying in large part on the United States
Supreme Court's holding in World-Wide Volkswagen that a
forum state may assert personal jurisidiction over a corpo-
rate defendant if the corporation "delivers its products
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that
they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
state." 4
3
Given the "substantial nature of Asahi's indirect busi-
ness with California, and its expectation that its product
would be sold in the state," the court concluded that
Asahi reasonably should have anticipated being sued in
California. 4 The court found that Asahi had knowledge
that its valve assemblies would be used in California and
that Asahi knew it would benefit from the sale of products
in California. Asahi, therefore, availed itself of the bene-
fits and protections of California's laws; moreover, it had
I, ld. at 41-42, 702 P.2d at 545, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
40 Id.
4' 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
42 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
4s 39 Cal. 3d at 40, 702 P.2d at 548, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (quoting Worldwide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298).
44 39 Cal. 3d at 48-49, 702 P.2d at 549-50, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 391-92.
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contacts with the state which were sufficient for the Cali-
fornia courts to constitutionally exercise jurisdiction. 45
Asahi argued that the "stream of commerce" theory
approved in World-Wide Volkswagen was not applicable un-
less the defendant actually attempted to exploit the fo-
rum's market. Such exploitation would include, for
example, developing an indirect marketing scheme to
serve the forum state or designing a product with an eye
toward compliance with the forum's rules and regula-
tions.4 6 The court rejected Asahi's argument, stating that
World-Wide Volkswagen did not require that the defendant
market its products in the forum state, but only that the
defendant "delivers its products into the stream of com-
merce with the expectation that they will be purchased by
consumers in the forum State." 47
After finding that Asahi's contacts with California satis-
fied the minimum contacts test, the court proceeded to
the second aspect of the due process inquiry, namely,
whether the exercise ofjurisdiction would be fair and rea-
sonable. In this inquiry, a court must balance "the incon-
venience to the defendant in having to defend itself in the
forum state against both the interest of the plaintiff in su-
ing locally and the interrelated interest of the state in as-
suming jurisdiction. '48 The court found that California's
interest in asserting jurisdiction over Asahi was substan-
tial and that assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi would be
fair and reasonable. 49
C. Forum Non Conveniens
The principle of forum non conveniens, originally recog-
nized by the United States Supreme Court in Gulf Oil
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 39 Cal. 3d at 45, 702 P.2d at 548, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (quoting Worldwide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298).
48 Id. at 44, 702 P.2d at 552, 216 Cal Rptr. at 394 (quoting Buckeye Boiler Co.
v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 898, 458 P.2d 57, 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. 118, 123
(1969)).
49 Id. at 45, 702 P.2d at 553, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
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Corp. v. Gilbert,5 ° permits a court to decline jurisdiction
even though venue and jurisdiction are proper, on the
theory that the action should be tried in another judicial
forum for the convenience of the litigants and witnesses.
In recent years several United States courts have dis-
missed cases arising from air crashes occurring abroad
pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens.51 The
most significant of these is Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 52 the
facts of which are fairly typical of foreign air crash cases.
In Piper, the court found that public interest factors fa-
vored trial in Scotland, even though the substantive law
that would be applied would be less favorable to plaintiffs
than the law of the chosen forum.53
Two recent California cases on forum non conveniens de-
serve our attention. The first is Holmes v. Syntex Laborato-
ries, Inc. 54 a non-aviation products liability action brought
by British citizens against three corporate defendants for
damages allegedly caused by an oral contraceptive. The
trial court granted the defendants' motion for dismissal
on the ground offorum non conveniens.55 The Court of Ap-
peal reversed, holding that the plaintiffs' choice of forum
was entitled to substantial deference and that the action
should not be dismissed absent a "suitable" alternative
forum.5 6 The court noted that no cause of action for strict
liability exists in Great Britain and that British negligence
law provides inadequate remedies for those injured by de-
fective products. The court concluded that litigation of
5o 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947).
51 See, e.g., Miskow v. Boeing Co., 664 F.2d 205, 207 (9th Cir. 1981) (court ap-
pliedforum non conveniens to dismiss action that should have been brought abroad),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 472 F.
Supp. 696, 702 (D. Del. 1979) (court dismissed case on grounds of forum non con-
veniens where Norwegian law was to be applied); Hemmelgarn v. Boeing Co., 106
Cal. App. 3d 576, 589-90, 165 Cal. Rptr. 190, 197-98 (1980) (dismissal on
grounds offorum non conveniens held proper where Canadian court could expedite
resolution of plaintiffs' claims and allocation of damages among defendants).
52 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
5s Id. at 260.
- 156 Cal. App. 3d 372, 202 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1984).
- Id. at 377, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 775.
56 Id. at 390, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
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the action in the United Kingdom would have denied
plaintiffs a suitable alternative forum.57 In so holding, the
court stated that California's law of forum non conveniens
differed from the rule enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in Piper in at least two fundamental re-
spects. First, the rule of substantial deference to the
plaintiff's choice of forum is more important in California
than in federal courts after Piper.58 In addition, California
attaches far greater significance to the possibility of an un-
favorable change in applicable law resulting from a forum
non conveniens dismissal.59
More recently, in Rehm v. Aero Engines, Inc. 6o the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal affirmed aforum non conveniens dismis-
sal arising out of the crash of an aircraft in Canada,
despite the fact that the defendant which rebuilt the air-
craft engine was a California corporation. The court
noted that the essential witnesses were in Canada, imme-
diate medical treatment was given in Canada, the crash
was investigated in Canada, the estate of the pilot was
pending in Canada, and all maintenance and operating
records relating to the aircraft were located in Canada.6'
In affirming the dismissal, the court stated that although
there was a temptation to explore some of the interesting
questions raised by Holmes and its diversions from Piper,
the case at bar was sufficiently distinguishable from Holmes
not to require such a step.62 The court went on to list the
following primary factors a court should consider in de-
termining whether to dismiss an action pursuant to the
doctrine offorum non conveniens: (1) the amenability of the
defendant to personal jurisdiction in the alternative fo-
rum; (2) the relative convenience to the parties and wit-
57 Id. at 383-88, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 780-82.
58 Id.
Id. at 381, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
210 Cal. Rptr. 594 (Ct. App. 1985). This decision of the Court of Appeal was
originally published at 164 Cal. App. 3d 715 (1985). The California Supreme
Court subsequently denied review and further ordered that the original opinion
not be officially reported.
61 210 Cal. Rptr. at 596-97.
(2 Id. at 597.
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nesses of trial in the alternative forum; (3) the differences
in conflict of laws rules applicable in the forum state and
in the alternative forum; (4) the defendant's principal
place of business; (5) whether the situation, transaction or
events out of which the action arose, existed, occurred in,
or had a substantial relationship to the forum; (6) whether
any party would be substantially disadvantaged in having
to try the action in the forum or in the alternative forum;
(7) whether any judgment would be enforceable by pro-
cess issued or other enforcement proceedings undertaken
in the forum; (8) whether witnesses would be inconve-
nienced if the action were prosecuted (a) in the forum or
(b) in the forum in which the moving party asserts it ought
to be prosecuted; (9) the relative expense to the parties of
maintaining the action (a) in the forum and (b) in the state
in which the moving party asserts the action ought to be
prosecuted; (10) whether a view of premises by the trier of
fact will or might be necessary or helpful in deciding the
case; (11) whether prosecution of the action will or may
place a burden on the courts of the forum which is unfair,
inequitable or disproportionate in view of the relation-
ship of the parties or of the cause of action to the forum;
(12) whether the parties participating in the action have a
relationship to the forum which imposes upon them an
obligation to participate in judicial proceedings in the
courts of the forum; (13) the interest, if any, of the forum
in providing a forum for some or all of the parties to the
action; (14) the interest, if any, of the forum in regulating
the situation or conduct involved; (15) the avoidance of a
multiplicity of actions and inconsistent adjudications; (16)
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (17) the
availability of compulsory process for attendance of wit-
nesses; (18) the relative advantages and obstacles to a fair
trial; (19) the public interest in the case; (20) whether ad-
ministrative difficulties and other inconveniences from
crowded calendars and congested courts are more prob-
able in the jurisdiction chosen by plaintiff; (21) whether
imposition of jury duty is imposed upon a community
1291986]
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having no relation to the litigation; (22) the injustice to,
and burden on, local courts and taxpayers; (23) the diffi-
culties and inconvenience to defendant, to the court, and
to jurors hearing the case, attending presentation of testi-
mony by depositions; (24) availability of the forum
claimed to be more appropriate; and (25) other relevant
considerations .63
Although the Rehm decision appears to be more consis-
tent with the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Piper, it is significant to note that in California there are
now differing interpretations of the requirements to be
satisfied for aforum non conveniens dismissal at the state and
federal levels. 64
In Byrne v. Japan Airlines, Inc. 65 the District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed an action for
personal injuries brought by a United States citizen who
resided in New York at the time of the accident. The acci-
dent occurred while the plaintiff was disembarking from
an aircraft in Bangkok, Thailand. The court stated that
plaintiffs choice of forum is normally deferred to under
the doctrine offorum non conveniens.66 However, the plain-
tiff was born in Thailand and maintained a temporary resi-
dence there. The defendant airline had offices in
Bangkok, and witnesses to the accident, persons who con-
ducted the investigation into the aircraft accident, and the
plaintiff's physicians all resided in Thailand. The court
found that United States interests in the controversy were
minimal compared to those of Thailand.67 Furthermore,
the court stated that it was reluctant to put itself in a posi-
tion of having to untangle Thai law. Therefore, for pur-
poses of public policy and private convenience, the court
held that Thailand was a more appropriate forum. 68 As is
usually the case, the court dismissed the action subject to
B' Id. at 596-97.
See Holmes, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 372, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
,' 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Id. at 17,105.
67 Id. at 17,107.
68 Id.
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the defendant's agreement to submit to jurisdiction in
Thailand, waive a statute of limitations defense that may
have existed prior to the initiation of the lawsuit, and pay
any judgment that might be rendered against it in
Thailand.6 9
In Recumar Inc. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines70 the District
Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed
two of three claims brought against KLM by foreign own-
ers of lost cargo. The court determined that the Warsaw
Convention applied to the first two claims since the goods
were shipped internationally. Therefore, subject matter
jurisdiction was improper with respect to these claims.
The rights and obligations of the parties had to be deter-
mined by the provisions of the Convention, not in the Dis-
trict Court.71  However, the court denied the airline's
motion to dismiss the third claim on the ground of forum
non conveniens.72 The Warsaw Convention did not apply to
the third claim because the transportation provided did
not constitute "international transportation" as defined in
Article 1(2) of the Convention.73 Since the carrier did not
meet its burden of showing that an adequate alternative
forum existed, the court was unable to dismiss the action
under theforum non conveniens doctrine.74 While the airline
suggested several alternative forums, it failed to specify
which of the alternative forums was the more convenient.
The court stated that it was impossible to weigh the rela-
tive advantages of the various forums and to designate a
more convenient forum.75
III. CONFLICT OF LAWS
In Ramirez v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. ,76 a case
- Id. at 17,107-08.
70 608 F. Supp. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
7 Id. at 799.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 798.
7. Id. at 799.
75 Id.
76 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
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arising out of the July 9, 1982 crash of a Pan American
aircraft shortly after takeoff from New Orleans, the New
York Supreme Court held that the law of New York ap-
plied to the issue of damages even though Louisiana was
the place of the accident. The administrators of several
decedents' estates brought actions in New York and
sought to have the law of Louisiana, the lex loci delicti,
applied to the issue of damages. The defendant sought to
have New York law, the law of the forum, applied or, in
the alternative, the law of the decedents' domiciles."
Louisiana law permitted recovery of damages for grief,
sorrow, and loss of consortium, whereas New York law
limited damage recovery in wrongful death actions solely
to pecuniary loss. 78 The court held that the lex loci rule is
no longer necessarily applied in airplane accidents be-
cause the place of the accident is purely fortuitous, and
other states may have greater policy interests in having
their law applied.79 In reaching its decision, the court
stated that absent contacts between the place of an acci-
dent, the victims, and the tortfeasor, there is little reason
to apply the law of the state where the airplane crashed.80
The court found that Pan Am was a corporation whose
principal place of business was in New York and that New
York's wrongful death damage law reflects the legislative
policy regarding the rights of decedents' estates and ex-
posure of negligent defendants.8 ' The court further
noted that plaintiffs exercised their option to choose New
York as the forum and that New York had an interest in
applying its own law to the issue of damages. 82
In Kinnett v. Sky's West Parachute Center, Inc.83 the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado applied
the law of the jurisdiction which had the "most significant
77 Id. at 17,136.





83 596 F. Supp. 1039 (D. Colo. 1984).
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relationship to the occurrence and the parties" instead of
the law of the situs of the accident.84 The decedent, a Wy-
oming resident, was killed when the airplane in which he
was a passenger collided with an airplane operated by the
defendant. The collision took place in Colorado near the
Wyoming border. The decedent's survivors, all residents
of Wyoming, commenced an action for wrongful death in
the District Court for the District of Colorado and moved
the court to apply Wyoming's wrongful death statute to
the action.8 5 Wyoming law allowed prevailing plaintiffs in
a wrongful death action to recover punitive damages for
loss of probable future companionship, society, and com-
fort.86 Colorado's wrongful death statute limited recovery
to net pecuniary loss and allowed no punitive damages in
a wrongful death action.'
The court held that Colorado's choice of law rules
would apply because subject matter jurisdiction over the
action was based on diversity of citizenship. 88 The court
further held that Colorado followed the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws, which provided that the law of the
state where the injury occurred would apply in a wrongful
death action unless some other state had a more signifi-
cant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, in
which event the law of the other state would apply.89 Col-
orado courts, therefore, apply the law of the state with the
"most significant relationship to the occurrence and the
parties."90
The court found that the most significant contacts in
this case were that (1) the plaintiffs resided in Wyoming,
(2) the decedent lived in Wyoming, (3) the decedent
purchased his ticket in Wyoming from a corporation do-
ing business there, (4) the decedent's purpose was to





89 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 7, 175, 178 (1960).
- 596 F. Supp. at 1041.
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travel roundtrip, commencing and terminating in Wyo-
ming, and (5) the accident occurred in Colorado airspace
near the Wyoming border, while the airplane was re-
turning to Wyoming. 9' Further, the court stated that Col-
orado's contact with this action was merely fortuitous in
that the Wyoming-bound airplane collided and crashed
south of the Colorado-Wyoming border. The court con-
cluded that Wyoming's interest in seeing that its citizens
were fully compensated outweighed the tenuous contacts
the accident had with the State of Colorado and ordered
that Wyoming's law governing wrongful death damages
be applied.92
In Risdon Enterprises, Inc. v. Colemill Enterprises, Inc.93
plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, brought an action in
Georgia against defendants for loss of the services of a
key employee who was killed in an airplane crash in South
Carolina. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds, inter alia, that the law of South Carolina gov-
erned the substantive rights of the parties, and under
South Carolina law the plaintiff corporation had no right
of recovery. The court held that under Georgia law the
lex loci delicti determines the substantive rights of the
parties.94 The court stated that the law of the place where
the tort or wrong has been committed is the law which will
be used to determine liability. The place of the wrong
was defined as the place where the last event occurs which
is necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort.9 5
In this case, the last event necessary to make defendants
liable for the alleged tort, the airplane crash, occurred in
South Carolina. Under the common law of South Caro-
lina, an employer had no right to sue a tortfeasor for inju-




03 172 Ga. App. 902, 324 S.E.2d 738 (1984).
Id. at 903, 324 S.E.2d at 740.
9 Id.
Id. at 905, 324 S.E.2d at 741.
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Under the Federal Tort Claims Act the liability of the
United States for an injury is to be determined "in accord-
ance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred. '97 In Richard v. United States98 the court held
that the "law of the place where the act or omission oc-
curred" includes the choice of law rules of that jurisdic-
tion.9 9 Three recent cases involved a choice of law
analysis in accordance with the provisions of the Federal
Tort Claims Act.
In Foster v. United States 100 the personal representatives
of the decedents' estates brought an action against the
United States. The claim arose out of an airplane crash in
which the decedents were killed. Plaintiffs alleged that
the accident resulted from the negligent provision of air
traffic control services to the crew of the airplane by air
traffic controllers in the Chicago Air Route Traffic Con-
trol Center.
The plaintiffs argued that the Illinois wrongful death
statute governed, while the defendant argued that Flor-
ida's wrongful death law controlled. 0 1 In Florida, unlike
Illinois, the representative of a decedent's estate may re-
cover on behalf of non-minor children only if such chil-
dren are partly or wholly dependent on the decedent for
support.10 2
Since Illinois was "the place where the act or omission
occurred," the court found that Illinois law governed, in-
cluding Illinois choice of law principles. Under Illinois
choice of law rules, the "most significant relationship"
test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws is used.10 3
According to this test, the lex loci delicti will be applied
unless another state has a "more significant relationship"
97 Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 29, § 1346(b).
98 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
Id. at 11.
768 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir. 1985).
Io, d.at 1279.
1 Id.
los Id. at 1280.
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to the occurrence or to the parties. 10 4 In determining
whether another state has a more significant relationship
to the occurrence or the parties, the Court should con-
sider the following: the place of the injury; the place of
the misconduct; the domicile, residence, nationality, place
of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; and
the place where the relationship, if any, between the par-
ties is centered.'0 5 Using the above criteria, the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the law of Illi-
nois should be applied to the case, reversing the ruling of
the district court. 10 6 According to the court, the State of
Illinois had the most significant contacts with the parties.
The alleged misconduct of the United States occurred in
Illinois, the only lineal descendant of the decedents was a
resident of Illinois at the time of the accident, and the re-
lationship between the decedents and the United States
was centered in Illinois. Although the estate was to be
probated in Florida and any recovery would take place
there, the court held that the interest of Illinois in deter-
ring tortious conduct in Illinois and in compensating its
citizens was greater than Florida's interest in limiting
recovery. 10 7
In Poindexter v. United States 108 a wrongful death action
arising out of the crash of a B- 17 aircraft in Nevada was
filed against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. The aircraft had been used in bombing forest
fires with fire retardant chemicals. Plaintiff alleged that
the accident occurred because the pilot had been permit-
ted to fly the aircraft after a shortened rest period and a
particularly long day's work. The district court, finding
that Arizona law applied because the heirs had received
death benefits in Arizona, held that the United States was
immune from suit as a statutory employer under Ari-
- See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 175, 178 (1960).
1o5 Id. § 145.
1- 768 F.2d at 1284.
107 Id.
os 752 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1984).
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zona's worker's compensation law. 10 9 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that since the "place
where the act or omission occurred" was Nevada, the law
of Nevada, including its conflict of law principles, was to
be applied pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act.110
Since Nevada applied the lex loci delicti principle in
choice of law questions, the law of Nevada controlled in
assessing the liability of the United States."'
In Texasgulf Inc. v. Colt Electronics Co. 112 the District
Court for the Southern District of New York applied New
York law in a case brought against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, in which plaintiffs as-
serted negligence of air traffic controllers. The air traffic
controllers were located in New York, and the crash oc-
curred in New York when the aircraft was attempting to
land in New York. The court found that New York was
the place where the "act or omission occurred."' 1 3
In a significant decision of the District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, In re Aircrash Disaster at War-
saw, Poland, on March 14, 1980,'" the court held that the
rationale behind choice of law questions under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act should similarly be applied under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, in view of the virtu-
ally identical "extent of liability provision" in both pieces
of legislation. Accordingly, where the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act provides that a foreign state shall be liable
for wrongful death damages "in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circum-
stances", the court is required to apply the law of the
place where the event giving rise to liability occurred.' 5
The court found that where an Ilyushin 62 aircraft be-
longing to LOT Polish Airlines crashed on final approach
1- Id. at 1318.
,,o Id. at 1319.
III Id.
112 615 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
11 Id. at 660.
114 No. CV-80-3317 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1985) (mem.).
-, Id. at 7.
1986] 137
138 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [52
to the airport at Warsaw, Poland, the law of Poland, in-
cluding its choice of law principles, was to be applied in
assessing LOT's liability. It was undisputed that LOT
was a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act and that Poland applies the lex loci delicti princi-
ple. Accordingly, since liability was presumed under the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention, and the act which
made LOT liable to plaintiffs was the crash of the airplane
rather than any previous negligence on the part of LOT,
the law of Poland was held to apply in determining the
nature and extent of the damages recoverable from
LOT. 1 6 The ruling of the Eastern District of New York
was recently followed by the Central District of California
in Palomino v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze," 7 another case arising
out of the same accident.
IV. LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIERS
A. The Warsaw Convention
The Warsaw Convention continues to engage the atten-
tion of the Courts and attract the condemnation of the
plaintiffs' bar. Surprisingly, perhaps, for the United
States, two of the most significant recent decisions on the
Convention, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint
Corp. ,l"' and Air France v. Saks," 9 were favorable to the air
transport industry. Time will tell whether these decisions
will prompt more positive action on the part of the United
States to deal with the general discontent over the limita-
tion of liability under the Convention.
1. Status of High Contracting Party
In a recent ruling of the District of Columbia in In re
Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983,120 the court
116 Id. at 14.
117 No. CV-81-1245 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1985). A similar ruling was issued in
Harris v. Polski Linie Lotnicze, CV 81-1133 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 1986).
-28 466 U.S. 243 (1984). See infra notes 177-180 and accompanying text.
119 105 S. Ct. 1338 (1985). See infra notes 154-160 and accompanying text.
120 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,584 (D.D.C. 1985).
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held that the Republic of Korea had adhered to the War-
saw Convention of 1929 through its ratification of the
Hague Protocol of 1955.121 Plaintiffs argued that the de-
fendant air carrier should not be permitted to rely on the
defenses provided by the Warsaw Convention because
the Republic of Korea was not a party to the original
Warsaw Convention, although it had ratified the Hague
Protocol to amend the Warsaw Convention. Since the
United States was a party only to the original Warsaw
Convention and had not ratified the Hague Protocol,
plaintiffs argued that the United States and Korea were
not in treaty relations with one another. 22 The court re-
jected this argument, relying principally on Article XXIII
of the Hague Protocol which provides that "[a]dherence
to this Protocol by any State which is not a Party to the
Convention shall have the effect of adherence to the Con-
vention as amended by this Protocol."' 23 Since Korea had
ratified the Hague Protocol on July 13, 1967, the court
held that it had likewise adhered to the Warsaw Conven-
tion as of that date.124
2. The Cause of Action Under the Convention
There is a line of authority in the Courts of Appeals for
the Second, 25 Fifth, 26 and Ninth Circuits' 27 establishing
that the Warsaw Convention is the basis of a right of ac-
tion against an air carrier for personal injury and wrongful
death occurring during international transportation to
which the Convention applies. Accordingly, courts have
121 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, 478
U.N.T.S. 371 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Hague Protocol].
122 19 Av. Cas. at 17,589.
"as Hague Protocol, supra note 121, at 387.
124 19 Av. Cas. at 17,588-89. See also Hyosung (America) Inc. v.Japan Air Lines,
624 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
12 Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
126 Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., 737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1984).
12, In Re Mexico City Aircrash, 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983).
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held that an action under the Warsaw Convention "arises
under the treaties or laws of the United States" and is
thus sufficient to ground federal question jurisdiction
over the subject matter.1 28
This line of authority was followed in Dorizas v. KL.M.
Royal Dutch Airlines,'2 9 where the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois held that the Warsaw Con-
vention creates its own separate cause of action for loss of
baggage and does not merely establish conditions for a
cause of action to be created under local law.' 30 A similar
ruling was made in the case of Harpalani v. Air India,
Inc.,13 1 in which the plaintiffs were denied boarding on an
Air India flight in India. The plaintiffs sued for damages
for delay, alleging causes of action under Article 19 of the
Warsaw Convention, breach of contract, and violations of
federal regulations and various consumer statutes. The
District Court held that Article 19 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion provides the exclusive remedy for delays in interna-
tional transportation by air and dimissed all of the
plaintiffs' other causes of action. 132
3. Notice of Liability Limitation
In In re Aircraft Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14,
1980 133 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that an air carrier which did not comply with the type-size
requirements for the notice of limitation of liability under
the Montreal Agreement 34 (the "Montreal Notice") could
neither avail itself of the liability limits under the Warsaw
Convention nor revoke its waiver of the Article 20 defense
128 See infra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
129 606 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
1so Id. at 98.
13, 622 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
132 Id. at 75.
1- 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 147 (1983).
134 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and
the Hague Protocol, Agreement CAB 18990, approved by Order E-23680, May
13, 1966 (Docket 17325), 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [hereinafter cited as "Mon-
treal Agreement"].
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of "all necessary measures."'' 3 5 The airline used 8.5 point
type instead of 10 point modern type as required by the
Montreal Agreement, a difference of 15/270 of an inch!
In a significant contrary ruling, the District Court for
the District of Columbia in In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of
September 1, 1983 136 held that an air carrier was entitled to
avail itself of the limitation of liability under Article 22 of
the Warsaw Convention, notwithstanding the fact that the
carrier issued airline tickets in which the Montreal Notice
appeared in 8 point type instead of the 10 point modem
type required by the Montreal Agreement. Plaintiffs ar-
gued that the carrier's failure to print the Montreal Notice
in 10 point type constituted "nondelivery" of a passenger
ticket under Article 3(2) of the Convention, and that ac-
cordingly the carrier should not be entitled to rely on the
limitation of liability established in Article 22 of the Con-
vention. 3 7 In a carefully reasoned analysis, Judge Robin-
son rejected plaintiffs' argument, holding that the
Montreal Agreement did not and cannot operate as an
amendment to the Warsaw Convention. 38 The Montreal
Agreement is merely a private agreement between the
Civil Aeronautics Board and those air carriers operating
into and out of the United States, and any breach thereof
could be redressed by appropriate means. 39 In reaching
its conclusion, the court refused to apply the reasoning
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Lisi v. Al-
italia-Linee Aeree Italiane.'40 In Lisi the Supreme Court
found that delivery of a ticket containing notice of the lia-
bility limitations printed in "microscopic type" consti-
tuted non-delivery of a ticket under Article 3(2) of the
Convention, thus depriving the carrier of the limitation of
-5 705 F.2d at 87.
136 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,584, 17,591 (D.D.C.1985).
137 Id. at 17,591.
1s Id. at 17,596.
139 Id. at 17,594-95.
140 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), affd by an
equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455, reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 929 (1968).
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liability under the Convention.'
4 1
In In re Aircraft Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14,
1980 142 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that the carrier could not avail itself of the liability limita-
tion provisions of the Warsaw Convention and Montreal
Agreement where notice of such limitation had been pro-
vided only in the domestic passenger tickets issued by
other airlines to members of the U.S. Amateur Boxing
Team who intended boarding an international flight to
Poland at New York's J. F. Kennedy Airport. In distin-
guishing Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,143 the court found
that when the passengers received their domestic airplane
tickets, none of them had any reason to believe they were
departing on a flight which was so integrally related to
their international flight that they should have heeded the
liability limitation provisions contained in those tickets
and acted accordingly, by purchasing insurance or making
alternative arrangements. 14
4
In Exim Industries, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc. "' the Second Circuit held that an air carrier need not
include in the air waybill every item of information called
for in Article 8 of the Warsaw Convention in order to rely
on the limitation of liability established under Article 22.
The court found that the items missing from one of the
subject waybills, including the method of packing and the
numerical markings, were technical and insubstantial
omissions of little commercial significance that did not
prejudice the shipper. 146 Accordingly, their omission did
not preclude reliance on the limitation of liability. With
respect to the second of the subject waybills, while infor-
mation was provided on the weight and number of pack-
ages, nothing was said about their volume and dimensions
or the number of items in each package. The Second Cir-
141 Id. at 243.
142 748 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1984).
"4 682 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1982).
144 748 F.2d at 96.
145 754 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1985).
146 Id. at 108.
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cuit held that the applicable provision in Article 8 of the
Convention should be read disjunctively, and only those
particulars having practical commercial significance with
respect to the shipment involved need be incorporated in
the waybill.' 47 Since no United States authority was di-
rectly on point, the court relied, inter alia, on the decision
of the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Eng-
land in Corocraft, Ltd. v. Pan American Airways, Inc.' 48 The
court also found that use of the term "may be" in inform-
ing shippers of the potential applicability of the Warsaw
Convention was an acceptable manner of giving reason-
able notice that the Warsaw Convention might be applica-
ble to the subject transportation. 49 The Second Circuit
rejected the final contention by the appellant that pre-
judgment interest should be awarded.'5 0
InJalloh v. Trans World Airlines'"' the District Court for
the District of Columbia held that the standard form of
notice of limitation of liability contained in passenger tick-
ets satisfied the Warsaw Convention notice requirements,
even where the carrier did not enter the specific weight of
luggage on the passenger's ticket. TWA's ticket contained
terms which stated that the weight of each piece of
checked baggage would be presumed to be 62 pounds (28
kilograms) unless otherwise stated on the baggage check.
The court held that this notice was sufficient and limited
TWA's liability accordingly.- 2
4. The Meaning of "Accident"
Article 17 of the Convention imposes liability on a car-
rier if the "accident" causing injury to a passenger takes
147 Id.
148 [1969] 1 QB. 616.
149 754 F.2d at 108.
-5 Id. at 109. The court relied on the reasoning of O'Rourke v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1984). In O'Rourke the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that to award prejudgment interest in excess of the $75,000
limitation imposed by the Montreal Agreement would be contrary to the purpose
of that agreement and the Warsaw Convention. Id. at 852-53.
'-' 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,804 (D.D.C. 1985).
152 Id. at 17,807.
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place on board the aircraft or while the passenger is "in
the course of any of the operations of embarking or dis-
embarking."'1 53 Several cases have considered what con-
stitutes an "accident" for purposes of Article 17 and when
a passenger is "in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking".
In Air France v. Saks 154 the United States Supreme Court
held that to be an "accident" under Article 17 of the War-
saw Convention, a passenger's injury must be caused by
"an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is ex-
ternal to the passenger."'' 55 Where the injury results from
the passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, nor-
mal, and expected operation of the aircraft, such injury
has not been caused by an accident under Article 17, and
there is no right of action against the air carrier. 156
In Saks the plaintiff was a passenger on an Air France
flight from Paris to Los Angeles. During the descent the
plaintiff felt severe pressure and pain in her left ear, which
continued after the aircraft landed. Shortly thereafter
plaintiff consulted a doctor, who found that she had be-
come permanently deaf in her left ear. Plaintiff filed suit
in a California State Court, alleging that her hearing loss
had been caused by the negligent maintenance and opera-
tion of the aircraft's pressurization system. The action
was removed to federal court, and Air France moved for
summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff could not
establish that her injury was caused by an "accident"
within the meaning of Article 17, since all the evidence
indicated that the pressurization system of the aircraft had
operated at all times in a normal manner. The district
court granted summary judgment, relying on precedent
defining the term "accident" in Article 17 as an unusual
or unexpected happening. 157 The Ninth Circuit reversed,
"' Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17.
1- 105 S. Ct. 1338 (1985).
155 Id. at 1345.
156 Id. at 1346.
157 Id. at 1340.
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holding that the language, history, and policy of the War-
saw Convention and Montreal Agreement impose abso-
lute liability on airlines for injuries proximately caused by
the risks inherent in air travel. The court indicated that a
normal cabin pressure change qualifies as an "accident"
under Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil
Aviation, which defines "accident" as "an occurrence as-
sociated with the operation of an aircraft..."15s
In rejecting the rationale of the Ninth Circuit, the
Supreme Court pointed to two significant features of the
wording of the Convention. First, Article 17 imposes lia-
bility for injuries to passengers caused by an "accident,"
whereas Article 18 imposes liability for destruction or loss
of baggage or goods caused by an "occurrence." Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, this difference in the parallel
language of Articles 17 and 18 implies that the drafters of
the Convention intended that the word "accident" mean
something different than the word "occurrence," other-
wise they would have used the same word in each arti-
cle. 1 59 Second, the text of Article 17 refers to an accident
which caused the passenger's injury, and not an accident
which i s the passenger's injury. It was thus clear that the
drafters of the Convention attempted to distinguish be-
tween the cause and the effect, specifying that air carriers
would be liable only if an accident caused the passenger's
injury. Thus an injury that was itself an accident was in-
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 17 of the
Convention. 160
Another important decision concerning Article 17 of
the Convention is Abramson v. Japan Airlines. 161 In that case
an airline passenger suffered an attack from a pre-existing
hiatal hernia shortly after takeoff from Anchorage on a
flight to Tokyo. The passenger had been under medical
158 Id.
,5 Id. at 1341-42.
, Id. at 1346.
161 739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1776, reh'g denied, 105 S
Ct. 2350 (1985).
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care for this condition for approximately six years but had
not informed the air carrier of his condition before the
flight. According to the passenger, he could have allevi-
ated the attack by lying down and massaging his stomach,
but he claimed that he was not permitted to do this be-
cause there were no empty seats. It was subsequently re-
vealed, however, that there were nine empty seats in the
first class section of the aircraft. The passenger alleged
that the hernia attack on board the aircraft constituted an
"accident" for purposes of Article 17 of the Convention,
for which the carrier should have been liable. The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected this argument,
however, and held that the plaintiff's difficulty was not re-
lated in any way to his transportation by air. Accordingly,
there was no "accident" under Article 17.162 More signifi-
cantly, the court found that since there was no accident to
invoke application of the Warsaw Convention, the claim-
ant was not barred from pursuing his state law reme-
dies. 63 It was improper, therefore, for the court to grant
summary judgment dismissing the claim under the War-
saw Convention since the plaintiff could still pursue a
state law claim against the air carrier.164
Abramson represents yet another attempt by the courts
to avoid the effect of the Warsaw Convention. On one
hand, the courts appear to be saying that the Warsaw
Convention is inapplicable because there has been no
"accident" pursuant to Article 17. On the other hand, the
carrier is being exposed to liability without limitation
under local state law essentially because of the conduct of
an airline employee on board the aircraft. The court's
reasoning in Abramson contradicts the Warsaw Convention
and leads to a logical absurdity. The intention behind the
Convention was to provide a uniform system of compen-
sation for passengers bringing claims against air carriers
engaged in international transportation. To suggest that
12 Id. at 133.
16, Id at 134.
164 Id.
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there is a manner in which a passenger suffers injury on
board for which the carrier is responsible, but which is not
covered by the Convention, is completely at odds with the
Convention's stated aims and is not supported by the law.
In Salce v. Aer Lingus Air Lines 165 the District Court for
the Southern District of New York dismissed an action for
personal injuries the plaintiff allegedly suffered after a
hard landing in Dublin, Ireland. The plaintiff claimed that
the neck injuries he suffered as a result of the landing sat-
isfied the "accident" requirement of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. The court disagreed and dismissed the complaint,
stating that the plaintiff failed to prove that the hard land-
ing was anything other than a routine landing.166 The
court also stated that even if the aggravation to the plain-
tiffs prior condition resulted from the landing, the land-
ing was not an "unexpected or unusual event" that would
satisfy the requirements of an "accident" under the War-
saw Convention. 167
In Salerno v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 168 the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York held that
knowledge of a bomb threat which subsequently caused a
passenger's miscarriage is an "accident" within the mean-
ing of the Warsaw Convention. 69 The incident giving
rise to this lawsuit involved the plaintiff and her two chil-
dren who were passengers aboard a Pan Am flight from
Miami to Uruguay. After the aircraft left Miami, the
ground personnel notified the cockpit crew that they had
received a bomb threat. The pilot radioed for permission
to land in the Bahamas, but the request was denied since
the runway in the Bahamas was undergoing repairs. The
aircraft then returned to Miami International Airport.
During the return flight to Miami, the crew notified the
passengers of the change of flight plans. Several passen-
165 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,377 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
1 Id. at 17,380.
167 Id.
- 606 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
169 Id. at 657.
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gers, including the plaintiff, became aware that the flight
attendants were searching the aircraft for a bomb. The
plaintiff subsequently exhibited symptoms which led to
her miscarriage approximately 24 hours later. The court
held that an "accident" within the meaning of the Warsaw
Convention caused the plaintiff's injuries because a bomb
threat is "external to the passenger" and is an unexpected
and unusual event outside the usual, normal, and ex-
pected operation of the aircraft. 170
5. Embarking and Disembarking
In Seidenfaden v. British Airways 17 a passenger arrived at
one terminal of London's Heathrow Airport and was al-
legedly injured while being pushed in a wheelchair by per-
sonnel employed by the carrier to another terminal at
Heathrow for purposes of departing on a domestic flight
to Manchester. The District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California held that the passenger was at all times
in the course of the operations of disembarking or em-
barking for purposes of Article 17, based on the fact that
the carrier was constantly in control of the passenger's
movements. 72 This decision appears to be consistent
with the three-part test established in Day v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. 173 and with the Convention's purpose to limit
the carrier's liability for injury wherever the actions of the
carrier are involved.
In Knoll v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 174 the District Court
for the District of Colorado held that an airline passenger
was not in the course of any of the operations of embark-
ing or disembarking when, upon arrival at London's
Heathrow Airport, she walked some 300 yards from the
170 Id.
17, No. 83-5540 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
172 Id.
173 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976). The three-part
test requires an examination of plaintiff's activity (what plaintiff was doing), con-
trol (under whose direction), and location to determine whether an accident is
governed by Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. Id. at 33.
14 610 F. Supp. 844 (D. Colo. 1985).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
arrival gate toward the immigration area before falling in
an area which was not leased by or under the control of
the carrier. The court found that the plaintiff was not
under the control of the air carrier but was involved in the
immigration process when she fell.' 75 The activities of
clearing immigration and customs were conditions im-
posed by the host country for the passenger's disembarka-
tion and were not imposed by the airline. Thus, the
plaintiff was not disembarking when the accident occurred
and could not invoke the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention. 17
6
6. Limits of Liability
The most significant recent development affecting the
liability of air carriers engaged in international transporta-
tion is the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp. 177 The
Supreme Court held that the limits of liability under Arti-
cle 22 of the Convention, which are expressed in French
gold francs, are to be converted into United States cur-
rency by using the last official price of gold. 78 Franklin
Mint sought damages of $250,000 for the loss of numis-
matic materials delivered to TWA for transportation from
Philadelphia to London. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit took the unusual step of holding that Arti-
cle 22 of the Warsaw Convention limited TWA's liability
but that the liability limits of the Convention were pro-
spectively unenforceable. 179 The Supreme Court found
the Convention limits enforceable and the decision of the
Civil Aeronautics Board to use the last official price of
gold as the conversion basis within the authority of that
agency and consistent with the Convention. 80
75 Id. at 846-47.
176 Id.
"1 104 S. Ct. 1776 (1984).
178 Id. at 1784-89.
" Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 690 F.2d 303, 304 (2d
Cir. 1982).
18o 104 S. Ct. at 1784-89.
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Since Franklin Mint was a cargo case, the question re-
mained whether the Supreme Court's ruling would apply
to personal injury and death cases. The United States
District Court for the Central District of California re-
solved the issue in In re Aircrash at Kimpo International Air-
port, Korea on November 18, 1980,181 holding that the
rationale of the Franklin Mint decision also applied to per-
sonal injury and wrongful death claims.' 82 Accordingly,
the limitation of liability of $75,000 established by the
Montreal Agreement of 1966 has been held to be valid
and enforceable. 83
Franklin Mint marked a significant victory for the air
transport industry and resolved an important area of dis-
pute concerning the Warsaw Convention and its applica-
bility. In view of the United States Senate's failure to
ratify the Montreal Protocols, which would have increased
the liability limitation to 100,000 Special Drawing Rights
in respect of personal injury and wrongful death, the ef-
fect of Franklin Mint is to establish firmly the limits of lia-
bility of air carriers in international transportation. In
personal injury and wrongful death actions, the limits are
$58,000 if the award excludes legal costs, and $75,000 if
the award is inclusive of legal costs. 18 4  With respect to
baggage and cargo, the limit remains at $20 per kilogram
or $9.07 per pound.18 5
As a result of the Franklin Mint decision, plaintiffs must
now seek other methods to avoid the Convention's limita-
tion of liability. Thus, one might expect that plaintiffs will
attempt to establish improper delivery of travel documen-
tation or seek to prove that the loss or damage suffered
resulted from wilful misconduct on the part of the carrier
or its employees.
18, MDL-482 (C.D. Cal. 1984), reversing the Court's earlier opinion at 558 F.
Supp. 72 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
182 Id.
18- See O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 842, 852 (2d Cir. 1984).
' Montreal Agreement, supra note 134.
185 104 S. Ct. at 1787.
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7. Wilful Misconduct
While the Supreme Court's holdings in TWA v. Franklin
Mint and Air France v. Saks may strengthen the resolve of
plaintiffs to attempt to establish wilful misconduct on the
part of a carrier or its employees for purposes of avoiding
the limitation of liability under Article 22 of the Conven-
tion, the courts have returned findings of wilful miscon-
duct in only a few cases. The only such case involving an
aircraft accident is Butler v. Aeromexico, 186 in which the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a finding of the
District Court for the Southern District of Alabama that
the carrier was guilty of wilful misconduct. The court
found that the actions of the Aeromexico flight crew, in-
cluding failure to monitor weather conditions and failure
to execute a missed approach when they lost visual con-
tact with the airport, constituted intentional performance
of acts with knowledge that under the circumstances in-
jury might result. 87
In Piano Remittance Corp. v. Varig Brazilian Airlines, Inc. 1'88
the court held that the failure of an air carrier's night shift
cargo supervisor to inform the day shift supervisor orally
of the anticipated arrival of valuable cargo, and the ship-
ping of such cargo without packaging it in a value pack,
did not constitute wilful misconduct. 8 9 It was not the
practice of the carrier, nor was it required by regulation,
that the night shift supervisor orally inform the day shift
supervisor of the anticipated arrival of such cargo, or that
valuable cargo be shipped in special packaging.
On the other hand, in Westway Metals Corp. v. Lan-Chile
Airlines 9 0 the court found an air carrier guilty of wilful
misconduct and hence liable for the full value of lost
cargo. The carrier failed to notify its stations of the arrival
of the plaintiff's valuable cargo, and an employee of the
186 774 F.2d 429 (11th Cir. 1985).
187 Id. at 431.
,- 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,381 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
189 Id. at 18,383.
-9o 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,556 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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carrier intentionally failed to accord the cargo the special
attention to which it was entitled, in contravention of the
carrier's own regulations. There was also evidence that
the carrier left the shipment unprotected on board the air-
craft in the presence of an unauthorized person, which the
court held constituted reckless indifference to the safety
of the cargo.' 9'
In Perera Co. v. Varig Brazilian Airlines, Inc. 192 the South-
ern District of New York found that the carrier's handling
of a shipment of gold bars violated all of its own rules and
procedures and familiar norms for the handling of high
value cargo, so as to justify a finding of wilful misconduct
on the part of the carrier.19 3 However, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision,
holding that the record did not support a finding of wilful
misconduct. 94  In Perera the shipper declared a value of
$22,500 for its goods and subsequently filed a claim in the
amount of $150,000. The Second Circuit stated that a
shipper who ships goods at a declared value substantially
below the worth of the goods in order to receive a re-
duced freight rate is gambling that the goods will not be
lost. 95 If the loss occurs, the shipper or consignee is not
entitled to recover the full value by misdescribing as "wil-
ful misconduct" acts which, at most, are questionably
negligent. 196
8. Notice of Claim
Under Article 26(2) of the Convention, in cases of dam-
age, the person entitled to delivery must complain to the
carrier forthwith after discovery of the damage. Such com-
plaint must be made within three days from date of re-
ceipt in the case of baggage and seven days from date of
-9, Id. at 18,559.
192 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,554 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
9 Id. at 18,556.
9 775 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1985).
15 id. at 24.
i1 Id.
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receipt in the case of goods. 197
In Insurance Co. of North America v. Yusen Air & Sea Service
(U.S.A.), Inc.'98 the court denied summary judgment in
favor of an air carrier and freight forwarder under Article
26 of the Convention. The court found questions of fact
as to when delivery took place, and whether a letter ad-
dressed to the freight forwarder stating that "there was
very substantial damage caused to one of the items" con-
stituted written notice of a claim. 199
A Florida court recently affirmed the established princi-
ple that written notice of loss is not required in a case of
complete loss of goods, as opposed to damage or delay.2 °°
9. Treaty Jurisdiction
With respect to treaty jurisdiction under Article 28 of
the Convention, the majority of circuits have held that, in
the case of a roundtrip ticket, the point of destination for
purposes of both Articles 1 and 28 is the "ultimate desti-
nation", that is, the point of departure.2 0 ' The only con-
trary cases in any jurisdiction are the California cases
Aanestad v. Air Canada, Inc. 20 2 and Hurley v. KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines.2 93 These cases suggested, in the face of
overwhelming authority to the contrary, that there could
be more than one place of destination in a roundtrip
ticket, depending on the passenger's intentions and
length of stay in a particular place.20 4 The decision of the
Central District of California in Hurley has now been va-
cated, however, and can no longer be regarded as
197 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 26(2).
lOS 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,271 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Id. at 18,272.
2- Bella Boutique Corp. v. Venezolana Internacional de Aviacion, S.A., 18 Av.
Cas. (CCH) 18,137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
201 See, e.g., Butz v. British Airways, 421 F.Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1976), afd without
opinion, 566 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1977).
202 390 F. Supp. 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1975), dismissed, 549 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1977).
203 562 F. Supp. 260 (C.D. Cal. 1983), vacated, 602 F. Supp. 1249 (C.D. Cal.
1985).
- 562 F. Supp. at 261.
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In Petrire v. Spantax, S.A. 206 the Second Circuit again ad-
dressed the issue ofjurisdiction under Article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention in the context of a roundtrip ticket.
Petrire involved a wrongful death action brought by the
widow of a passenger killed in the crash of a Spantax air-
craft in Malaga, Spain. The decedent had purchased a
ticket for travel from Madrid to New York via Malaga with
a return flight from New York to Madrid. The ticket pro-
vided for the decedent's return to Madrid five days after
his arrival in New York and consisted of two booklets.2 °7
The plaintiff asserted that the United States was a destina-
tion because New York was listed as a destination in the
first booklet. The plaintiff also argued that an air traveller
should not be deprived of the option of purchasing "two
one way tickets for the purpose of assuring Article 28 ju-
risdiction and a desired national venue. ' 20 8 The airline
asserted that the passenger's destination was not the
United States for purposes of the Warsaw Convention's
jurisdictional provision. The Second Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the action by the District Court and stated
that a single contract had been made with Madrid as the
final destination, regardless of the number of booklets is-
sued. Accordingly, Spain was the proper place for juris-
diction under Article 28(1).209
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached a
similar result in In re Alleged Food Poisoning Incident, March
1984, 210 holding that for Warsaw Convention purposes
"the place of destination" of a passenger's journey in
cases of roundtrip carriage is the ultimate destination,
that is, the place from which the journey originated.2 1 '
Accordingly, when a passenger flying on a roundtrip jour-
205 602 F. Supp. at 1249.
20 756 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1985).
207 Id. at 265.
208 Id. at 266.
209 Id.
21o 770 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1985).
2' Id. at 4-5.
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ney originating and terminating in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
purchased and paid for a ticket in Saudi Arabia, and a car-
rier domiciled in Great Britain performed the transporta-
tion, a United States court had no jurisdiction over the
matter. 2  The passenger had purchased one ticket in two
booklets for a roundtrip journey from Riyadh with agreed
stopping places in the United States. The court held that
the destination of a journey, for Convention purposes, is
determined by reference to the intent of the parties, and
that when different carriers are involved the pertinent unit
of travel to determine the destination is the entire undi-
vided transportation as stated in the contract of transpor-
tation.21 3 Thus, in cases involving roundtrip travel on
successive carriers, the place of destination is the place
where the journey originated. 1 4
In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983 215 in-
volved one of three separate actions arising out of the de-
struction of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 by Soviet military
aircraft over the Sea of Japan. The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia held that if treaty juris-
diction under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention did
not exist, plaintiffs could not bring wrongful death actions
arising out of the destruction of Flight 007 in the United
States.21 Plaintiffs made no showing that jurisdiction ex-
isted in the United States pursuant to the requirements
enumerated in Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention. The
United States was neither the domicile nor the principal
place of business of Korean Air Lines, the decedents did
not purchase their tickets in the United States, and the
United States was not the final destination of the dece-
dent's travel.2 17 The court also found that the decedent's
break in transportation in the United States was
212 Id. at 5.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 4-5.
2,, 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,578 (D.D.C. 1985).
216 Id. at 17,580.
217 Id. 17,581-84.
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insignificant.21 8
In Sabharwal v. Kuwait Airways Corp.2' 9 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York dis-
missed an action for damages for lost luggage. The court
discussed the requirements of Article 28(1) of the Con-
vention, which requires that a plaintiff bring its action at
either (1) the domicile of the carrier, (2) the carrier's prin-
cipal place of business, (3) the carrier's place of business
where the contract was made, or (4) the place of destina-
tion. The court found that none of the specified locations
were in the United States and dismissed the complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 220
10. Limitation of Actions
In Darghouth v. Swiss Air Transport Co.22 1 the District
Court for the District of Columbia held that the two year
time limitation specified in Article 29 of the Warsaw Con-
vention was intended to be absolute, barring any action
not commenced within the two year period.22 2 According
to the Court, the minutes of the Warsaw conference
clearly indicate that the delegates did not intend to have
the two year period interrupted or suspended by local
tolling statutes. The tolling provisions of the District of
Columbia's statute of limitations thus had no effect on a
suit brought more than two years after the date of the ac-
cident on behalf of a child injured by a falling food service
cart during a flight. 223
In H. S. Strygler & Co. v. Pan American Airlines, Inc. 224 the
Southern District of New York confronted a statute of lim-
itations issue under Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention.
The action involved the loss of a shipment of fresh water
pearls between China and New York City. The airline ad-
218 Id. at 17,583-84.
219 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,380 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
220 Id. at 18,381.
221 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,536 (D.D.C. 1984).
222 Id. at 18,537.
222 Id. at 18,536-38.
224 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,280 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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mitted liability as limited by Article 22 of the Warsaw
Convention. 2 5 More than two years after the date of the
arrival of the pearls in New York, however, the shipper
commenced suit to recover the amount of the loss in ex-
cess of the limits of liability under the Convention. In ac-
cordance with Article 29(2) of the Convention, the court
applied New York law to determine the method of calcu-
lating the treaty limitation period. Under New York law
the statute of limitations period commences at the time
the action accrues, in this case the date the shipment was
delivered. Since the shipper filed suit more than two
years after the date of delivery, the court dismissed the
action.226
In Johnson v. Allied Eastern States Maintenance Corp.227 the
court found that Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention
barred an action against an independent contractor acting
as a skycap service for an airline when the plaintiff com-
menced the action more than two years after the accident.
The court stated that the test to determine the applicabil-
ity of the Warsaw Convention was whether the particular
activity of the agent which resulted in injury was in fur-
therance of the contract of carriage. 2 If the response is
in the affirmative, the independent contractor is entitled
to the same protection as the airline under the Warsaw
Convention.229
B. Denied Boarding and Discrimination
Carriers in the United States frequently face claims for
denied boarding resulting from the oversale of flights.
Allegations of discrimination on the part of the carrier in
violation of section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act 23 0
often accompanied these claims when the incident giving
225 Id. at 17,281. Liability was based upon a formula of price per kilogram be-
cause no value had been declared by the shipper. Id.
226 Id. at 17,282.
227 488 A.2d 1341 (D.C. 1985).
228 Id. at 1345.
229 Id.
2so 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374(b) (1982).
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rise to the claim occurred prior to January, 1985. Section
404(b) provides that no air carrier shall give any undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage to any person in
any respect whatsoever, or subject any person to unjust
discrimination or undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage.2 3 1
For many years the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) ad-
ministered a denied boarding compensation scheme for
flights originating in the United States. The functions of
the CAB with respect to denied boarding compensation
passed to the Department of Transportation (DOT) upon
entry into force of the CAB Sunset Provisions on January
1, 1985.232 In summary, the present regulations provide
that if oversales occur on a flight originating in the United
States, the airline must offer cash, free flights, or both in
an attempt to persuade volunteers to relinquish their
seats. In the absence of enough volunteers, passengers
may be involuntarily denied boarding in accordance with
the carrier's established boarding priority. The carrier
must pay a bumped passenger the face value of his ticket,
up to $200, if alternate transportation is not scheduled to
arrive within one hour of the originally scheduled time of
arrival. This figure doubles if the arrival time exceeds two
hours on domestic flights or four hours on international
flights. The regulations also include requirements relat-
ing to the provision of notice to passengers of their rights.
While acceptance of denied boarding compensation may
relieve the carrier of further liability, many passengers
choose not to accept this compensation and to bring a pri-
vate lawsuit against the carrier.233
Several recent cases have established the rights of
bumped passengers to compensation and have discussed
the interrelationship between denied boarding and sec-
2s, Id. Section 404(b) was repealed effective January 1, 1985. Civil Aeronautics
Board Sunset Act of 1984, 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(4)(C) (Supp. 11 1984). See United
States Dept. of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 106 S.Ct. 2705 (1986).
232 Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, H.R. 5297, 98th Cong. 2d Sess.
(to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1551).
233 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 250.1 - 250.11 (1986).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
tion 404(b). In Ross v. American Airlines, Inc. 234 a New York
federal court held that section 404(b) of the Federal Avia-
tion Act (the "Act") provided a private right of action to a
passenger who was bumped from a flight in an allegedly
discriminatory manner. The plaintiff alleged that the air-
line removed her from the aircraft because she was a wo-
man during a stopover at Dallas-Fort Worth on a flight
from Austin, Texas to New York. The court held that it
was not significant that the passenger did not have a con-
firmed reservation at the time of the incident.235 Accord-
ingly, a passenger needed only demonstrate a violation of
the statute in order to establish a right of action.236 Any
recovery, however, would depend on the extent of dam-
ages proved by the passenger.
In Goranson v. Trans World Airlines237 a New York state
court held that the denied boarding compensation
scheme established under the Act and its regulations was
not intended to be the sole remedy available to a passen-
ger.238 Thus, the denied boarding compensation scheme
did not immunize an air carrier from a common law action
for breach of contract arising out of the bumping of a pas-
senger. The significance of this case is that a carrier may
still face a lawsuit by a passenger based on a breach of the
contract of transportation, even if the passenger is denied
boarding in a non-discriminatory manner in accordance
with the boarding priority established by the carrier.239
In Mendelson v. Trans World Airlines240 a New York state
court held that an air carrier had no duty to disclose its
overbooking policy in advertisements or in any other
manner and accordingly, dismissed an action against the
234 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,205 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
235 Id. at 17,207.
26The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the existence of a private right
of action under 404(b) of the Act for passengers who suffer unjust discrimination
or prejudice. Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir.
1984).
237 467 N.Y.S.2d 774 (City Ct. White Plains 1983).
238 Id. at 779.
239 Id.
240 466 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
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carrier based on fraudulent misrepresentation. 24 1 The
court further held that a confirmed reservation did not
amount to a warranty of boarding, when the tickets ex-
pressly stated that a passenger holding a confirmed reser-
vation might be denied passage. The court did find,
however, that a plaintiff could state a cause of action for
discrimination under section 404(b) of the Act when a car-
rier violated its own boarding priority rule.24 2
In Biswas v. British Airways 243 the court struck plaintiffs'
claim for punitive damages based on denied boarding
when the passenger was unable to demonstrate that the
carrier had acted with fraud, oppression, or malice as re-
quired by section 3294 of the California Civil Code.244
In Jacobson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 241 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that to require handicapped pas-
sengers to sign a release prior to boarding, acknowledg-
ing that they may be refused passage or removed at any
point upon medical advice or if it became necessary for
the comfort and safety of other passengers, was discrimi-
natory and in violation of section 404(b) of the Act.246
The court acknowledged that the carrier had the right
under its tariffs and the Act to remove passengers if nec-
essary for the safety of the flight or other passengers. 47
However, the discrimination lay in requiring only handi-
capped passengers to sign the release while not requiring
the same from other passengers.2 48
In Hinden v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 249 the court granted
summary judgment to a carrier that was sued for refusing
to allow the plaintiff, who was confined to a stretcher, to
board one of its L- 1011 aircraft. The Federal Aviation
241 Id. at 170.
242 Id. at 171.
243 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,104 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
244 Id. at 17,105.
245 742 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 2129 (1985).
248 Id. at 1206.
247 Id.
248 Id.
24Q 490 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
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Regulations applicable to the L- 1011 provided that the
aircraft could be used only for transportation of persons
able to sit in an upright position during takeoff, landing,
and emergency operations and was not designed or ap-
proved for the transportation of passengers in a horizon-
tal position.250 Under the circumstances, the court held
that the carrier did not abuse its discretion in denying
passage to the plaintiff and dismissed the action.2 5'
The outcome of this case does not appear to give an
unqualified right to an air carrier to deny boarding to any
passenger confined to a stretcher. The carrier should be
aware of and comply with the applicable Federal Aviation
Regulations relating to the carriage of such passengers in
the particular type of aircraft in question.
In Drakos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.252 plaintiff sued
TWA for unjust discrimination because TWA removed his
92 year old father from a flight from Athens to New York.
The court found that the removal of the passenger, who
could only walk using a walker and had to be carried onto
the airplane, was not an abuse of discretion, in view of
TWA's decision that he might require excessive assistance
from the flight attendants and thereby pose a danger to
the flight.253 The court found that TWA was acting in ac-
cordance with its tariff and, as a matter of law, did not
abuse its discretion in removing Mr. Drakos from the
airplane.25 4
C. Tariffs and Incorporated Terms
Since the deregulation of domestic transportation, do-
mestic carriers are no longer required to file their tariffs
with the Civil Aeronautics Board. Instead, the applicable
regulations now permit carriers to incorporate by refer-
2-0 Id at 990.
231 Id.
2352 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,866 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
2- Id. at 17,870.
2 Id. at 17,869-70.
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ence terms and conditions in the contract of carriage. 25 5
The regulations require that the ticket or other written in-
strument given to a passenger contain a conspicuous no-
tice that any terms incorporated by reference are part of
the contract and that passengers may inspect the full text
of each term incorporated by reference at the carrier's air-
port or city ticket offices.2 56 While the regulations permit
carriers to incorporate terms which limit a carrier's liabil-
ity for personal injury or death of passengers, the validity
of such clauses has yet to be determined.
With respect to international tariffs, the CAB Sunset
Act of 1984 provides that in the future these will be filed
with the Department of Transportation and will continue
to be applied essentially in the same manner as under the
CAB.25 7
Hopper Furs, Inc. v. Emery Air Freight Corp.258 was an ac-
tion for breach of contract and negligence brought by a
fur company whose shipment of furs had been lost by Em-
ery. At the end of the trial, the carrier moved for a di-
rected verdict limiting liability to the amount set forth in
its service guide. The service guide, incorporated in the
air waybill, stated that the carrier's liability was limited to
$10.00 per pound or $22.05 per kilogram of cargo dam-
aged or lost, plus the amount of the carrier's transporta-
tion charges applicable to the part of the shipment lost or
damaged, unless the shipper declared a value for carriage
in excess of the $10.00 per pound limitation at the time
the shipper tendered the shipment to the carrier and paid
a proportionately higher fee. 259 The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit held that the express terms of the con-
tract, which limited the carrier's liability, were controlling.
The court modified the judgment limiting the damages to
$10.00 per pound of lost cargo. 260 The plaintiff claimed
2-5 14 C.F.R. § 253.4(a)(1986).
256 Id. § 253.5.
2-7 49 U.S.C.A. § 1551 (West Supp. 1986).
25a 749 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1984).
259 Id. at 1262.
260 Id. at 1265.
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that its mistake in filling out the air waybill should void
the contract, including the limitation of liability. The
court, however, stated that the plaintiff's mistake in plac-
ing figures in the air waybill box entitled "zip code" in-
stead of in the box entitled "declared value" was a
unilateral mistake, unrecognized by the shipper, and as
such could not form the basis for reformation of the
contract.
26 1
In Madla v. Austin Travel262 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that an air-
line was not responsible for insuring that passengers car-
ried the proper travel documents to allow them to enter
the foreign country that was the destination of their air
travel. In reaching its decision, the court stated that the
tariff which an air carrier has on file with the Civil Aero-
nautics Board (now the Department of Transportation)
forms part of the contract between the carrier and the
passenger.26 3 The tariff of the subject airline placed re-
sponsibility for carrying the proper travel documents on
the passenger and expressly absolved the carrier from any
liability for damages resulting from the passenger's failure
to carry proper travel documents. 264 The plaintiffs al-
leged that the tariffs related only to rates, fares, and
charges, and that one of the provisions of the airline's
tariff required that the airline refuse carriage to any pas-
senger whose travel documents were not complete. This
implied, the plaintiffs argued, that the air carrier should
have refused transportation to the passengers whose doc-
uments were incomplete. The court rejected this argu-
ment and stated that the tariff merely allowed the airline
the option of refusing to transport a passenger whose
travel documents were incomplete.2 65 The court further
stated that the tariff gave the passengers constructive no-
261 Id.
262 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,277 (N.D. I1. 1984).
263 Id. at 17,280.
26 Id. at 17,279-80.
265 Id. at 17,280.
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tice that the air carrier did not undertake to help passen-
gers comply with documentation requirements of the
countries of their destination. 66
In Ragsdale v. Airborne26 7 the Georgia Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of an
air carrier that had failed to timely deliver plaintiffs gov-
ernment bid.268 The plaintiff brought an action for breach
of contract, negligence, and fraud based on the carrier's
failure to deliver, on time, its government bid to a United
States Army base in Virginia. The plaintiff alleged that it
would have been awarded the contract if its bid had been
delivered as contracted. The bid reached the base ten
minutes after the bidding closed. The Appellate Court
stated that the executed air waybill did not indicate a de-
clared value, and accordingly, the carrier's liability was
limited to the amount indicated in its tariff as set forth in
the language on the air waybill. 269 The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the liability limitation set forth in
the air waybill was inapplicable due to the elimination,
under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, of an air car-
rier's obligation to file tariffs. 70
Bernstein v. Cunard Line271 involved a suit in which sev-
eral travellers on a combination cruise and air vacation
trip alleged breach of contract and negligence and sought
recovery of damages from both the shipping line and the
air carrier when their return trip by air was delayed due to
a blizzard that closed the destination airport. The ship-
ping line moved for summary judgment, alleging that its
contract with the passengers provided for only the cruise
portion of the trip and that it was not responsible for any-
thing that took place after the completion of the cruise.
The court denied the shipping line's motion, stating that
there existed questions of fact as to the extent of the ship-
2,6 Id.
267 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,321 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
268 Id. at 17,322.
26 Id. at 17,323.
270 Id. at 17,322.
271 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,485 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ping line's responsibilities for the entire journey. 72 How-
ever, the court granted the airline's summary judgment
motion, holding that the airline ticket constituted the con-
tract between the airline and the passengers and that the
contract clearly stated that the airline was not responsible
for any delay caused by weather.273
In Neal v. Republic Airlines, Inc.2 7 4 the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judg-
ment in favor of an airline that had been sued for damages
arising from its failure to deliver human remains by a des-
ignated time. The complaint alleged counts in tort, bail-
ment, and breach of contract. The court held that the
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. In reaching its decision, the court stated that
the plaintiffs could only pursue a cause of action for
breach of contract and could not avoid the liability limits
imposed by the contract of transportation by framing
their complaint in terms of tort and bailment. 275 The
court further noted that Republic's air waybill stated on
its face that the transportation was subject to the condi-
tions of the contract, which included specific liability limi-
tations. Since the shipper was afforded notice of
Republic's rate and liability structure, it had adequate op-
portunity to declare a higher value for the shipment in ex-
cess of the contract liability limits. 276 The court also
dismissed plaintiffs' breach of contract action against Re-
public on the grounds that plaintiffs were neither parties
nor third party beneficiaries to the contract with Republic,
but at most incidental beneficiaries.277
The District Court for the District of Oregon in Deiro v.
American Airlines, Inc. 278 found that the notice contained on
the passenger ticket limiting the carrier's liability for bag-
272 Id. at 17,487-89.
273 Id. at 17,489-90.
274 605 F. Supp. 1145 (N.D. Il1. 1985).
275 Id. at 1148.
276 Id. at 1148-49.
277 Id. at 1150.
278 19 Av. Gas. (CCH) 17,777 (D. Ore. 1985).
1986] 165
166 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [52
gage loss to $750.00 was adequate to both inform the pas-
senger of the limitation and afford him the opportunity to
protect himself by choosing a higher liability and paying a
higher rate. 79
In Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Great Western Airlines, Inc.28 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed a district court judgment which held
that Great Western, as an agent or connecting carrier for
Federal Express under a wet lease agreement, was entitled
to benefit from the limitation of liability contained in the
Federal Express airbills. The goods in question had been
destroyed in the crash of a Great Western airplane. The
Eighth Circuit agreed that federal law was controlling and
assumed that Federal Express could limit its liability pur-
suant to its contract of transportation. The court, how-
ever, found that under federal common law the carrier's
agent is liable for the full value of goods damaged by the
agent unless statute or contract expressly extends the lim-
itation of liability to the agent.2 8 ' In Arkwright-Boston no
contract extended the liability limitation to Great West-
ern, and it was therefore liable for the value of the goods.
In Clemente v. Philippine Airlines282 the District Court for
the Southern District of New York held that a carrier was
not liable for breach of contract for refusing transporta-
tion to passengers who failed to reconfirm their return
reservations at least 72 hours prior to departure, as re-
quired by the terms of the ticket and the annexed advice
to international passengers. The court held that even if
the airline's employee who sold the ticket told the passen-
gers they did not need to reconfirm the reservation 72
hours in advance, the carrier was not liable for breach of
contract because the annexed advice to the ticket indi-
cated that such confirmation was needed. 83 The court
279 Id. at 17,780.
280 767 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1985).
281 Id. at 428.
282 614 F. Supp. 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
283 Id. at 1199.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
determined that the airline's tariff filed with the CAB con-
stituted part of the contract of carriage between the pas-
senger and the airline, and the terms of the tariff and the
contract of transportation governed the rights and liabili-
ties of the parties. 2s4
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit in Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors285 held
that an airline is not liable for the damages suffered by
passengers when they are refused entry into a foreign
country. The court also held that the airline is not liable
for its failure to warn the passengers that they might be
turned away by immigration officials. 86 Upon plaintiffs'
arrival at Santo Domingo Airport, the Dominican Repub-
lic immigration officials refused to permit the plaintiffs to
enter because their names were on a list of "undesirable
aliens." The court held that the airline had no duty to
provide food and lodging for the passengers after officials
ordered the airline to transport the passengers out of the
country on the next flight. Since the airline had no con-
trol over the circumstances and there was no evidence
that the passengers could not pay for their own subsis-
tence, the airline was not in breach of its contract of car-
riage.28 7 Furthermore, the court found that the airline
was not in breach of its contract for failing to return the
passengers to the United States after they had voluntarily
decided to vacation in Haiti instead of immediately re-
turning to Miami.288
D. Duty to Warn
In Kohler v. Aspen Airways 289 a California Court of Appeal
held that an airline does not have a duty to warn passen-
gers of possible turbulent weather. This action involved a
plaintiff who was aboard a 45 minute Aspen Airways flight
284 Id.
28 761 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 408 (1985).
286 Id. at 1536.
287 Id. at 1536-37.
288 Id. at 1537.
289 171 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 214 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1985).
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from San Jose, California to Lake Tahoe. The weather
forecast for the flight indicated clear weather with occa-
sional moderate turbulence at 5,000 feet. While in the
Lake Tahoe area, the airplane hit a pocket of severe clear
air turbulence and dropped 500 feet in a matter of
seconds. As a result, the plaintiff injured her neck. The
airplane landed safely at South Lake Tahoe Airport with-
out further problems. In reaching its decision, the court
also rejected the application of res ipsa loquitur to the facts
of the case and found that injuries resulting from such an
encounter with turbulence cannot be said to ordinarily oc-
cur only because of negligence.2 9 °
V. LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS
In Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp.29 1 the heirs of four peo-
ple who were killed in the crash of a Beech Travelair air-
craft in 1974 during a demonstration flight sued Beech
Aircraft Corporation on a variety of theories including
negligence per se, alleging that the aircraft did not com-
ply with various safety regulations adopted by the FAA.
The California Supreme Court found that although the
FAA had certified that the design of the aircraft complied
with all applicable safety regulations, nothing prevented
the plaintiffs from proceeding against Beech under state
law for negligence in the design of the aircraft on the ba-
sis of its violation of the FAA's safety regulation. 92 The
court found that the trial court's negligence per se in-
struction to the jury did not intrude into a field pre-
empted by federal law. Congress intended to allow the
states to apply their own laws in tort actions against air-
craft manufacturers for the defective design of aircraft,
even though federal law may have completely occupied
the field of regulation of aircraft safety and certification.
Accordingly, the court reached the curious result that
2-0 Id. at 1201-02, 214 Cal. Rpr. at 723-25.
- 37 Cal. 3d 540, 691 P.2d 630, 208 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1984) cert. denied, 105 S.Ct.
2345 (1985).
292 Id. at 548-55, 691 P.2d at 634-37, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 878-83.
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although the manufacturer had complied with the FAA's
requirements with respect to certification, it was still held
liable on a negligence per se theory on the grounds that
the aircraft did not, in fact, comply with such regulations
at the time of its certification.293
In Brocklesby v. United States294 survivors of crew mem-
bers of a World Airways aircraft that crashed near Cold
Bay, Alaska in 1973 brought suit against the Government
and against Jeppesen and Company, the publisher of an
allegedly defective instrument approach chart. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that instru-
ment approach charts are "products" for product liability
purposes and that a chart manufacturer must bear the
costs of accidents that are proximately caused by an ap-
proach chart's defects.295 The Court of Appeals denied
Jeppesen's petition for reconsideration of the court's
prior decision affirming Jeppesen's liability in the amount
of $12,785,580.81 for deaths and property damage aris-
ing out of the crash.296 The court heldJeppesen liable on
the ground that an instrument approach procedure devel-
oped by the Government and published in chart form by
Jeppesen caused the accident. 97 In rejecting Jeppesen's
petition for rehearing, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its
prior determination that the approach chart is a "prod-
uct" and that a defect in the Jeppesen chart properly re-
sulted in the imposition of strict product liability even
though all of the defects in the chart stemmed from the
Government's alleged failure to establish a safe instru-
ment approach procedure. 9 8
In the amended opinion accompanying the August 2,
1985 decision, the court noted Jeppesen's argument that
to hold a chart manufacturer strictly liable for accurately
293 Id.
2- 753 F.2d 794 (9th Cir.), vacated, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106
S.Ct. 882 (1985).
295 753 F.2d at 800.
- 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985).
27 Id. at 1296.
298 Id. at 1295-96.
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republishing a government regulation was unfair. While
the Ninth Circuit agreed that Jeppesen should not be held
liable for accurately republishing a government regula-
tion, the court found that the charts were more than a
mere republication of the government procedures. Jep-
pesen converted them into a new form, a distinct product.
Jeppesen was responsible, as manufacturer and marketer,
for insuring that the charts were not unreasonably dan-
gerous in their intended use.2 99
In Fluor Corporation v. Jeppesen & Co.,300 a death action
arising out of an aircraft crash in New York, the California
Court of Appeal recognized that no California state court
had yet decided whether Jeppesen Navigation Charts or
similar charts may be deemed to constitute "products" for
purposes of determining the applicability of strict liability
principles. The aircraft struck the side of a hill at 2,140
feet as the pilot was attempting a landing. The hill was
not designated on the Jeppesen Instrument Approach
Chart for the airport, despite the fact that it represented
the highest point in the crash area. The chart showed a
hill of only 1,991 feet in elevation as being the highest hill
in the area.30'
The California Court of Appeal stated that characteriz-
ing Jeppesen Instrument Approach Charts as "products"
serves the paramount policy to be promoted by the strict
tort liability doctrine, the protection of otherwise defense-
less victims of manufacturing defects and the spreading
throughout society of the cost of compensating them.3 0 2
The court noted that "it would be difficult indeed to con-
ceive of a salable commodity with more inherent lethal
potential than an aid to aircraft navigation that, contrary
to its own design standards, fails to list the highest land
mass immediately surrounding a landing site. '3 0 3 The
29 Id. at 1298.
3- 170 Cal. App. 3d 468, 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1985).
so, Id. at 473, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
302 Id. at 475, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
10, Id. at 476, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71-72.
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court further noted that the issue of the crew's alleged
negligence at the trial may have determinative significance
but cautioned that while comparative fault principles
have been extended to actions founded on strict liability,
the conduct of the injured party is to be compared not to
the manufacturer's conduct but to its product for the pur-
pose of apportionment.3 0 4 The court followed prior deci-
sions of United States Courts of Appeals holding that
Jeppesen charts are "products", such as Brocklesby v.
United States,30 5 Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 306 and Aetna Cas-
ualty And Surety Co. v. Jeppesen & Co. 30 7
In In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983 308
Boeing and Litton (manufacturers of the aircraft and its
navigation equipment) filed motions for summary judg-
ment. For purposes of the motions, Boeing and Litton
assumed that a defect existed in the navigation equipment
and that the defect caused the aircraft to deviate from its
course. Boeing and Litton argued that even if the aircraft
did deviate from its course because of defective equip-
ment, the defect was not a proximate cause of the accident
because (1) it was not reasonably foreseeable that a Rus-
sian aircraft would shoot down a civilian passenger air-
craft, and (2) the actions of the Russians constituted an
independent and intervening cause of plaintiffs' dam-
ages. 30 9 The court agreed, finding that Boeing and Litton
had no duty to anticipate or guard against the attack be-
cause it was not foreseeable and that without such duty
there could be no legal responsibility or liability for plain-
tiffs' harm. The court accordingly granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Boeing and Litton.31 °
s Id. at 480, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
S05 753 F.2d 794, 800 (9th Cir.), vacated, 767 F.2d 1288, 1298 (9th Cir.) cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 882 (1985).
- 707 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir. 1983).
o7 642 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1981).
-08 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,853 (D.D.C. 1985).
:09 Id. at 17,855.
lo Id. at 17,857-58.
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In Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol 3 1' the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit outlined the three requirements that a
manufacturer of military products must satisfy in order to
avail itself of the "government contractor defense" in a
products liability action. The manufacturer must estab-
lish that (1) the government established the specifications
for the product, (2) the product met the government spec-
ifications in all material respects, and (3) the government
knew as much or more than the manufacturer about the
hazards of the product.3 12 In Koutsoubos a helicopter man-
ufactured by the defendant crashed, killing its crew. The
Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the District
Court, which had found that the manufacturer satisfied
the requirements of the government contractor
defense.313
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently
recognized the availability of a "military contractor de-
fense" if the contractor meets the court's standard for es-
tablishing the defense. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.314
was an action for wrongful death resulting from the crash
of a Grumman A-6 aircraft piloted by a lieutenant in the
United States Navy. The Eleventh Circuit expressed its
dissatisfaction with the "government contractor defense"
adopted in cases such as Koutsoubos and established its
own test.3 15 It found that as a general rule the military
contractor will be liable for injuries to servicemen caused
by defective products designed by the contractor. The
contractor may escape liability only if it affirmatively
proves (1) that it did not participate, or participated mini-
mally, in the design of the products or parts shown to be
defective, or (2) it timely warned the military of the risks of
the design and notified it of alternative designs reasonably
known to the contractor, and (3) the military, even though
" 755 F.2d 352 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 72 (1985).
-12 Id. at 354.
3, Id. at 354-55.
-14 778 F.2d 736 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
su3 Id. at 744-45.
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forewarned, clearly authorized the contractor to proceed
with the dangerous design. 16 The court stated that the
overriding objective of the test was to determine whether
a military decision to go ahead with the product was actu-
ally made; if so, the contractor would be absolved from
judicially imposed liability.31 7
VI. LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) authorizes actions
against the United States Government for damages
caused by the negligence of a government employee while
acting within the course and scope of his employment. 1 8
An important exception to the Government's liability
states that the FTCA shall not apply to claims based upon
the exercise or performance of, or the failure to exercise
or perform, a "discretionary function" or duty on the part
of the federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved is abused.3 1 9
In Murf v. United States3 20 the District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas found that the failure of air traf-
fic controllers to watch, warn, and maintain separation of
two aircraft that were involved in a mid-air collision con-
stituted negligence for which the United States was liable
under the FTCA.3 2 1 In Murif a Cessna 172 operating
under visual flight rules (VFR) collided in mid-air with a
Fairchild F-27 operating under instrument flight rules
(IFR). The trial court found that the controllers had an
"earlier" duty to direct the aircraft operating under IFR
and only a secondary duty to the aircraft operating under
VFR. According to the record, the controllers on duty at
the time of the accident had the time and ability to direct
the crew of the VFR aircraft, and their failure to do so was
316 Id. at 746.
317 Id.
318 Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 29, § 2672.
-9 Id. § 2680(a).
s 9 598 F. Supp. 290 (E.D. Tex. 1984).
s2 Id. at 294.
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a breach of their duty. 22 On appeal, 23 the Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that the conduct of the pilot and in-
structor in choosing to maneuver in the traffic area at a
dangerous altitude, without landing lights, was the pri-
mary cause of the midair collision. The court held the
greater fault lay with the pilot and the instructor because
their duty to avoid the accident was primary while the
controllers' duty was secondary. Consequently, the survi-




Freeman v. World Airways, Inc.3 25 involved two actions
that arose out of the crash of a World Airways aircraft at
Boston's Logan International Airport on January 23,
1982. Plaintiffs brought actions for personal injuries suf-
fered in the crash and sought both compensatory and pu-
nitive damages. World Airways and the Massachusetts
Port Authority moved for partial summary judgment on
the issue of punitive damages. The District Court dis-
missed the claims for punitive damages, stating that the
law of Massachusetts controlled the passengers' claims for
punitive damages and that Massachusetts law does not al-
low such damages in personal injury cases.3 26 Although
the parties involved had contacts with several other states
that would allow punitive damages in personal injury
cases, the court held that Massachusetts had the most sig-
nificant interest in the punitive damages issue. The court
stated that the location of the injury, most of the allegedly
negligent conduct, and the physical conditions surround-
ing the crash gave Massachusetts the most significant rela-
322 Id.
323 785 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1986).
324 Id. at 555.
325 596 F. Supp. 841 (D. Mass. 1984).
320 Id. at 848-49.
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tionship to the parties and the injuries suffered.3 27
In Metz v. United Technologies Corp.3 28 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit determined that damages for
future lost wages, pain and suffering, and medical ex-
penses should be reduced to present value. Metz involved
a personal injury action resulting from the crash of a heli-
copter at Newark International Airport in 1979. The
plaintiff had been awarded damages in excess of two mil-
lion dollars. The trial court had refused to instruct the
jury regarding present value calculations. The appellate
court stated that the law is concerned with not only the
pain and suffering of the individual but also the loss soci-
ety would have to bear, including the increased cost of
insurance. The court further stated that after an adequate
provision has been made for the injured plaintiff, the goal
is to achieve a fair and reasonable allocation of loss by
discounting the awards of future damages to present
value. 29
Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Metz
held that damages for future lost wages were to be dis-
counted to present value, the court indicated that if a ju-
risdiction whose law applied to the issue of damages
provided a rule with regard to the discounting of future
damages, the rule of law of the jurisdiction would pre-
vail. 3 ° In Metz the applicable law (Louisiana) did not ad-
dress the issue of discounting future damages.
In Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Texasgulf Aviation 33 ' the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York denied a motion in limine by the executor of an
estate to exclude evidence of the effect of prospective in-
come tax liability on a future earnings award in a wrongful
death action. New York law based the calculation of dam-
ages for wrongful death on the amount of future assist-
327 Id. at 846-49.
328 754 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1985).
32 Id. at 67.
33 Id.
3 604 F. Supp. 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
1986]
176 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [52
ance the survivors could reasonably have expected if the
decedent had not died. 2 Although it stated that calculat-
ing the effect of the income tax on future earnings would
be speculative to some extent, the court noted that the
monetary support a wage earner contributes to a family is
affected by taxes that he must pay. Thus, since there are
comprehensible methods of calculating the effect of these
taxes on future earning awards, the court held that the
effect of income taxes is not too speculative for a jury to
consider.33
B. Mental Anguish and Emotional Distress
An increasingly difficult aspect of aviation litigation in
the United States concerns claims for mental anguish and
emotional distress. These claims are often asserted in the
context of a claim for bodily injury, but more and more
these claims are being made when baggage has been
delayed or lost, when a passenger is denied boarding, or
when a passenger is on board an aircraft during a rejected
take-off or forced landing.
The traditional rule in most jurisdictions in the United
States has prevented a person from recovering damages
for mental anguish or emotional distress unless accompa-
nied by some form of bodily injury. 4 In some jurisdic-
tions, notably California, the law has changed in recent
years to permit the recovery of damages for mental
anguish and emotional distress in circumstances where
the claimant has not suffered injury to his or her body.
The case which changed the law in California is Molien v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 35 in which the California
Supreme Court held that a hospital and a doctor were lia-
ble to a husband for his emotional distress when he and
his wife were divorced after the doctor negligently mis-
3-1 Id. at 700.
s33 Id. at 702.
3-4 See, e.g., Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115
(1967).
--, 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
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diagnosed that the wife was suffering from a venereal
disease.
Another area in which liability for mental anguish and
emotional distress has been expanded, again in states
such as California, concerns the witnessing of injury to an-
other person. Traditionally, the law did not permit a by-
stander to recover damages for injuries suffered by
another person. 36 However, the California Supreme
Court held in Dillon v. Legg33 7 that an immediate relative
of a victim who contemporaneously observed the accident
in which the victim was injured, and thereby suffered
emotional distress, could recover damages for such dis-
tress from the person causing the injury to the victim. 3 8
In LeConte v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 339 the Fifth
Circuit, applying Louisiana law, denied a claim for mental
anguish on behalf of two law enforcement officers who
suffered nausea, insomnia, and other symptoms after han-
dling bodies of passengers who died in the crash of a Boe-
ing 727 at Kenner, Louisiana, on July 9, 1982. Louisiana
law does not permit recovery for mental anguish suffered
by a bystander because of injury or death to another
person. 4 o
In Quill v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.3 41 the Minnesota
Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's denial of a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and held that
the nature of an accident in which an aircraft spun uncon-
trollably downward 34,000 feet resolved all doubts of the
genuineness of the claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress although the passenger's accompanying
physical symptoms were not severe. 42 During a TWA
flight from New York to Minneapolis, the aircraft was
3-1 See, e.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d
513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
-7 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
538 Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
" 736 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1984).
4o Id. at 1021.
31 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
342 Id. at 439-40.
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cruising at an altitude of 39,000 feet when it suddenly
rolled over and plunged downward. The tailspin contin-
ued for 40 seconds at speeds just below the speed of
sound, causing the plane to shake violently. The pilots
regained control of the airplane only five seconds before
it would have struck the ground. 43
In In re Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, Louisiana on
July 9, 1982,344 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that one who simply is exposed to the results of an
aircrash without sustaining any physical injury or property
damage, and who was not in any personal danger, cannot
recover damages for mental anguish under Louisiana law.
This action arose out of the crash of a Pan American Boe-
ing 727 in Kenner, Louisiana, on July 9, 1982. Plaintiff
was a homeowner in the neighborhood where the aircraft
crashed who observed the general devastation that was
brought about as a result of the crash. The homeowner
alleged that he suffered severe anxiety for several weeks
following the accident, primarily related to the possible
consequences that he and his family could have suffered
as a result of the crash. The Fifth Circuit reversed a jury
award of damages for past and future mental pain and suf-
fering and the costs of psychiatric treatment related
thereto, stating that an individual who is simply exposed
to the results of the crash without sustaining any physical
injury or property damage cannot recover for mental
anguish under Louisiana law.345
C. Post- Traumatic Stress Disorder
An area of mental injury which is becoming increasingly
important to aviation interests is post-traumatic stress dis-
order (PTSD). PTSD occurs when a person is subjected
to a shocking or horrifying event called a "stressor,"
which affects the person subsequently by causing symp-
toms of distress. These symptoms include reliving the
-4- Id. at 440.
-44 764 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1985).
-' Id. at 1083-84.
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event, nightmares, loss of appetite, mood changes, feel-
ings of despair, and even changes in personality. During
World War I, this condition was described as "shell
shock," and during World War II the condition was re-
ferred to as "battle fatigue." After the Vietnam conflict,
numerous veterans suffered from this condition, and the
American Psychiatric Association inserted PTSD in the
third edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
(DSM) for Mental Disorders.3 46
One consequence of the acknowledgement of PTSD as
a legitimate psychological disorder is that plaintiffs in air
disasters are now seeking damages as a result of this con-
dition. It is not difficult to see how someone might suffer
from PTSD after surviving an air crash. However, claims
based on PTSD are also being made in cases where the
event in question would not normally be particularly hor-
rifying or shocking to the average person. A recent exam-
ple is an aborted takeoff of a DC-10 at Bangkok
International Airport where the passengers were safely
evacuated by means of the escape slides. One or two pas-
sengers complained of bumps and bruises, but several
passengers presented claims against the carrier alleging
that they were suffering from severe personality disorders
which were akin to PTSD.3 47
The problem with PTSD is a simple one. Many people
suffer from a wide variety of emotional problems that re-
semble personality disorders. Frequently, the traumas of
everyday life, including the break-up of relationships or
the loss of a job, will push these people "over the brink"
and cause them to start suffering severely from their un-
derlying emotional difficulties. While traveling on board
an aircraft, often at a high level of anxiety and fear, people
with serious emotional problems could suffer severe emo-
tional distress as a result of an event that might not be
overwhelmingly shocking to an average person. Indeed,
-6 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MErAL DISORDERS 236-39 (3d ed. 1980).
' All of such claims were settled without litigation.
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the claims arising out of the aborted takeoff in Bangkok
appear to involve several people who were suffering from
severe anxiety and emotional distress prior to the subject
flight. The problem is in distinguishing between emo-
tional distress attributable to the person's experience on
board the aircraft and that which was pre-existing. Ac-
cording to the "egg shell skull" rule, courts should permit
recovery of the full amount from the party responsible for
the accident if it is difficult to distinguish between emo-
tional distress which may be attributed to pre-flight events
and that attributable to the flight itself.3 48
Recently, psychiatrists have begun to formulate tests
which attempt to indicate the extent to which a person is
suffering from PTSD.3 49 These tests are constantly being
revised and refined, and one hopes they will prove to be
useful in the future in defining the limits of a defendant's
responsibility in a PTSD situation.
D. Pre-Impact and Post-Impact Pain and Suffering
Courts in the United States are increasingly recognizing
a right of recovery for pre-impact pain and suffering by a
passenger prior to his death in an aircraft accident. In
Haley v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 350 the Fifth Circuit
recognized that such a right of recovery exists in the State
of Louisiana, provided the claimant can prove such pre-
death pain and suffering. While conceding that damages
could not be awarded where the only evidence to support
them was speculative or conjectural, the court stated that
it was not necessary for a claimant to produce eyewitness
testimony to support an award of damages for pre-impact
348 The "eggshell skull" rule originated in England with the case of Dulieu v.
White, [1902] 2 K.B. 669, in which a man with an "eggshell skull" died in a situa-
tion where a normal man would have only suffered a minor injury. Id. at 679. See
also McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 94 N.E. 616 (1911); R.
KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE 66-73 (1973).
349 Dr. David Foy of the UCLA Medical Center has formulated two such tests,
the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Checklist and the Plane Crash Trauma Event
List.
s- 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1984).
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pain and suffering. Provided there was sufficient evidence
for the trier of fact to reasonably infer that such pain and
suffering occurred, such a finding would be competent. 51
In In re Aircrash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25,
1979 35 2 the Northern District of Illinois held that Illinois
law, which allows recovery for pre-impact pain and suffer-
ing, applied to the claims of numerous plaintiffs even
though not all the decedents were domiciled in the State
of Illinois.
In Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.353 the Second Cir-
cuit reversed a jury award for pre-impact pain and suffer-
ing, finding no evidence to indicate that the decedent was
aware that anything was wrong immediately prior to the
impact.
In Pregeant v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.3 ' the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judg-
ment of a lower court which had returned a verdict in
favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages for pre-im-
pact mental anguish and post-impact suffering. The court
stated that the jury had not erred in awarding such dam-
ages to the surviving parents of an airplane crash vic-
tim. 35 5 The record contained sufficient evidence upon
which a jury could base a finding of pre-impact mental
suffering for 20 seconds before impact. The award of
post-impact pain and suffering required proof that the de-
cedent was conscious, however briefly, following the acci-
dent. Such proof could be inferred from the facts and
circumstances surrounding the crash, and the court held
that it was not improper for the jury to have done so in
this case. 56
s', Id. at 316-17.
52 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,490 (N.D. Il. 1984).
727 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1984).
762 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1250.
'" Id. at 1249-50.
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VIII. INSURANCE
In Puckett v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co. 3 5 7 the Texas Supreme
Court held that a causal connection was required between
the breach of a policy condition and a loss before the in-
surer would be permitted to rely on such breach of condi-
tion to avoid payment under the policy. 358 The court
stated that failure to require such causal connection be-
tween the breach and the loss would violate public policy.
In Potter v. Ranger Insurance Co. 359 the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit upheld a policy exclusion which pro-
vided that the policy did not apply "to any insured ...
who operates or permits the operation of the aircraft,
while in flight, unless its airworthiness certificate is in full
force and effect."'3 60 The insured conceded that the air-
worthiness certificate of the aircraft was not in full force
and effect at the time of the accident. The insured at-
tempted to assert that the exclusion was ambiguous and,
further, that it required knowledge on his part that the
aircraft was being operated while the certificate of airwor-
thiness was not in effect. The Ninth Circuit (emphasizing
use of the word "unless," which directly preceded the lan-
guage regarding the airworthiness certificate) found that
the language clearly stated that the aircraft was not cov-
ered unless a valid and effective airworthiness certificate
was in force at the time of the loss.3 61
In Threlkeld v. Ranger Insurance Co. 362 the California
Court of Appeal rejected a similar attempt on the part of
the insured to characterize as ambiguous an exclusion re-
lating to losses occurring when the insured operated or
permitted the operation of the aircraft without a valid air-
worthiness certificate. 63 The aircraft's airworthiness cer-
tificate provided that it would remain in effect as long as
678 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. 1984).
I38 d. at 938.
"9 732 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1984).
Is" d. at 743.
Id. at 744.
562 156 Cal. App. 3d 1, 202 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1984).
, Id. at 7-8, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 532-33.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
the aircraft was maintained in accordance with FAA regu-
lations. The insured contended that the exclusion was
ambiguous since it could be construed to incorporate all
FAA regulations into the policy, thus rendering the exclu-
sion invalid under California Insurance Code section
11584. At the time of the accident section 11584 pro-
vided that "no policy of insurance issued or delivered in
this state covering any loss, expense or liability arising out
of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an aircraft shall
exclude or deny coverage because the aircraft is operated
in violation of federal or civil air regulations, or any state
law or local ordinance. This section does not prohibit the
use of specific exclusions or conditions in any such policy
which relates to. . . establishing limitations on the use of
the aircraft. ' ' 3 64 The court found that section 11584 had
been interpreted to prohibit exclusions or denials of cov-
erage when an aircraft was being operated in violation of
federal laws and regulations, but found that the exclusion
involved in the action did nothing more than establish a
limitation on the use of the aircraft.365 Such exclusion is
expressly authorized by section 11584 of the California
Insurance Code. 66
In General Electric Credit Corp. v. Southeastern Aviation Un-
derwriters, Inc.367 breach of warranty coverage had been ob-
tained in favor of a company financing the purchase of the
insured aircraft. The breach of warranty endorsement
provided, inter alia, that the insurance afforded by the pol-
icy "shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the
Named Insured nor by any change in the title or owner-
ship of the aircraft but conversion, embezzlement or se-
cretion by or at the direction of the Named Insured is not
covered hereunder; . . . Nothing herein contained shall
vary, alter, waive or extend any of the terms, provisions,
representations, conditions or agreements of the policy
' CAL. INS. CODE § 11584 (West 1972).
36. 156 Cal. App. 3d at 9, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
- CAL. INS. CODE § 11584(4) (West 1972).
-r7 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,827 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
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other than as above stated. 368
The insured argued that the endorsement took prece-
dence over the original wording of the policy and that it
excluded from coverage only those conversions, embez-
zlements, or secretions which were "by or at the direction
of the named insured." Accordingly, since the conversion
of the insured aircraft in this case had been by a lessee of
the aircraft without the insured's involvement, the plain-
tiff was entitled to recovery. The United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania rejected
this argument, holding that the provisions of the endorse-
ment did not purport to extend any particular form of
coverage to the lienholder, but simply excused the
lienholder from the penalty of invalidation of existing pol-
icy coverages which might otherwise result from the act or
neglect of the named insured.3 69 Thus, while the
lienholder was relieved from certain consequences of the
insured's conduct that would otherwise invalidate the pol-
icy, conversion, embezzlement and secretion by or at the
direction of the named insured would invalidate the pol-
icy, even as to the lienholder. Accordingly, the court
found that the lienholder was not entitled to recovery
when the aircraft had been converted by a party to whom
it had been leased by the insured, since the endorsement
did not vary or extend any of the existing provisions of
the policy.370
In O'Connor v. Proprietors Insurance Co. 3 7 1 the Colorado
Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the Colorado
Court of Appeals, held that when there is a provision in
an insurance policy specifically excluding coverage in the
event of an FAA violation, the insured is not entitled to
recover unless it can be established that no causal rela-
tionship existed between the FAA violation and the acci-
s- Id. at 17,828.
-9 Id. at 17,828-29.
370 Id. at 17,830.
17, 696 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1985).
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dent giving rise to coverage. 72 The policy in question
provided no coverage for losses incurred if the aircraft
was operated in violation of the terms of the Federal Avia-
tion Airworthiness Certificate or Operational Record.
Since the aircraft had not had its required annual inspec-
tion, the court found that the aircraft insurance policy did
not cover damages sustained by the aircraft in the crash.
The court held that the insured was not entitled to re-
cover under the policy unless he could prove that no
causal relation existed between the FAA violation and the
accident and that the insured did not meet his burden of
proof.373
The conventional liability insurance policy provides not
only an indemnity to the insured for liability incurred
under the policy, but also provides a defense to the in-
sured in respect of claims and lawsuits which may be insti-
tuted against him. An insurer thus has a duty to defend as
well as a duty to indemnify if the liability is covered by the
policy.
The traditional rule, which is still the majority rule, is
that the insurer has a duty to defend every action in which
the complaint shows a claim for damages covered by the
policy.3 74 In some states, including California, the duty to
defend has been expanded to hold that an insurer must
defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within the
coverage of the policy. 75 Thus, an obligation is imposed
on the insurer to investigate a claim to determine whether
the facts surrounding it might give rise to a claim that,
although not set forth in the complaint, would be covered
by the policy.
To avoid the possibility of being sued in a bad faith
action for wrongful failure to defend, insurers in the
372 Id. at 286.
373 Id.
374 See, e.g., Greer-Robins Co. v. Pacific Surety Co., 37 Cal. App. 540, 541, 174
P.2d 110, 111 (1918); Maxon v. Security Ins. Co., 214 Cal. App. 2d 603, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 586, 593 (1963).
115 See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 273, 419 P.2d 168, 177, 54
Cal. Rptr. 104, 111 (1966).
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United States frequently undertake to defend an insured
under a reservation of rights. In such a situation the in-
surers provide a defense and simultaneously reserve their
right to establish subsequently that the insured was not
entitled to such defense, or that while the insured was en-
titled to a defense, he is not entitled to indemnity under
the policy.
In Buck v. United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. 376 the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed the rule
that the construction favoring coverage must be adopted
when an insurance policy contains an ambiguous provi-
sion. In Buck the term "any employee" was liberally con-
strued to mean even a "temporary" employee, as opposed
to a "regular" employee, operating an aircraft at the time
of an accident.3 77 In that case a helicopter pilot involved
in an accident was exempt from an otherwise applicable
insurance policy exclusion. The court held that although
the plaintiff was not a "regular" employee the term "any"
employee was ambiguous. Thus, the plaintiff was an addi-
tional insured under the policy and was entitled to have
the insured defend him in a tort action.3 78
In a recent California case, San Diego Navy Federal Credit
Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. ,9 the California Court
of Appeal held that when insurers provide their own
counsel to defend an insured under a reservation of
rights, in circumstances where a conflict of interest exists
between the insurers and the insured, the insured is enti-
tled to counsel of his own choosing at the expense of the
insurers.380 The potential conflict of interest between in-
surer and insured in the defense of liability cases, where
coverage is in issue, has attracted considerable attention
in the United States. Indeed, the Cumis decision has at-
tracted a great deal of attention in view of its potential
376 763 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1985).
377 Id. at 227.
378 Id.
319 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984).
380 Id. at 375, 208 Cal Rptr. at 506.
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implications. The judgment of the California Court of
Appeal seems to imply that whenever coverage is in ques-
tion, the insurers should appoint two counsel, one to pro-
tect the interests of the insurers and one to protect the
interests of the insured. However, numerous questions in
relation to such an arrangement remain unanswered. For
example, what would the respective responsibilities of
each set of counsel be vis-a-vis the conduct of the litiga-
tion? Would the insured be entitled to select any law firm
to represent his interests, regardless of expense? Would
the insured be bound to select a law firm which charged a
reasonable fee? What would be reasonable in the context
of any particular case?
One anticipated result of the Cumis decision may be that
insurers will be more reluctant to contest coverage or to
reserve their rights to do so, in view of the legal costs
which could be incurred. The resolution of other ques-
tions surrounding this issue remains to be seen.
IX. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
In District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc. 3 8 1 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia addressed the ques-
tion of whether an airline is responsible for the costs of
rescue and clean up provided by municipal police and
emergency services at the site of an aircraft disaster. The
accident in question was the 1982 crash of an Air Florida
jet into the Fourteenth Street bridge in Washington, D.C.
The court held that recovery of such costs is governed by
local law. Since the local municipal law did not address
the issue, the general common law rule was applied.3 8 2
The common law rule provides that the costs of public
services for protection from fire or for other safety pur-
poses is borne by the general public as a whole and is not
assessed against the tortfeasor whose negligence creates
the need for the emergency services.383 Thus, an airline is
-81 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
382 Id. at 1079.
383 Id. at 1080.
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not liable for police and other emergency services pro-
vided at the site of an aircraft disaster unless the local mu-
nicipal law specifically addresses the issue and requires
reimbursement from the airline.384
In United States v. One Rockwell International Commander
690C/8403 85 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
ruled that aircraft which are used to transport illegal
drugs are exempt from governmental forfeiture under the
Aircraft Confiscation Act if the flight on which the illegal
drugs are transported is conducted as a common carrier
flight.386 The rationale for the decision was that the car-
rier should not be penalized by the forfeiture of its aircraft
absent privity or consent on the part of the carrier to carry
the illegal drugs. As long as the carrier held itself out as a
common carrier to the public and was willing to carry all
passengers for hire indiscriminately, and no employee or
agent of the carrier was privy to or consented to the trans-
portation of illegal drugs, the carrier was exempt from
governmental forfeiture. 87
In Brown v. Byard388 the District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio held that the Federal Aviation Act does
not create an implied private cause of action for the repre-
sentatives of a person killed in an air crash. The court
found no indication in the legislative history of the Act
that Congress intended to create a private cause of action
in favor of the representatives of an air crash victim.
Thus, a cause of action by the representatives of a de-
ceased person must be based on local law.389
In Friel v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 390 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit determined that the recently enacted
three year statute of limitations of the Death on the High
Seas Act ("DOHSA") applied to an action, even though a
584 Id.
-5 754 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1985).
386 Id. at 287.
387 Id.
-8 600 F. Supp. 396 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
383 Id. at 399.
o 751 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1985).
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two year statute of limitations was in effect at the time of
the accident. The action sought damages for the death of
an individual who was forced to abandon his airplane
while flying from Santa Barbara, California to Hawaii.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, contend-
ing that the action was barred by the two year statute of
limitations. The district court disagreed, holding that the
three year limitation period applied, and denied the mo-
tion for summary judgment.3 9 ' The appellate court af-
firmed the district court's ruling, stating that the three
year statute of limitations applied to the action even
though the accident occurred when the two year statute of
limitations was in effect. The court stated further that the
intent of Congress in making the change from a two year
to a three year statute of limitations was to eliminate un-
certainty and to provide a uniform limitation for all mari-
time torts.392
In Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc. 393 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit held that, based on its interpre-
tation of section 7 of DOHSA, litigants may pursue claims
for recovery under state wrongful death actions even in
light of the existence of DOHSA.394 The action arose out
of the death of two offshore workers who were killed in a
helicopter crash approximately 30 miles off the Louisiana
coast. The plaintiff sought to recover damages for pecu-
niary as well as nonpecuniary loss under Louisiana law.
DOHSA does not allow recovery of damages for nonpecu-
niary injuries. The court held that Louisiana had the au-
thority to apply its Death Act to its own citizens in actions
arising on the high seas adjacent to the Louisiana coast.3 95
In Baker v. Burbank - Glendale - Pasadena Airport Author-
ity396 homeowners living adjacent to an airport filed suit
39, Id. at 1039.
392 Id. at 1039-40.
39s 754 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1985).
s- Id. at 1277.
395 Id. at 1286.
3- 39 Cal. 3d 862, 705 P.2d 866, 218 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1200 (1986).
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against the airport for inverse condemnation and nui-
sance arising from operation of the airport. The trial
court sustained a demurrer to both causes of action and
dismissed the inverse condemnation action because the
defendant was prohibited by statute from exercising the
power of eminent domain. The court dismissed the nui-
sance action because it was barred by the statute of limita-
tions covering permanent nuisances. 97
The California Supreme Court held that inverse con-
demnation is not based on the power of an entity to exer-
cise eminent domain, but rather on a showing that the
damage resulted from an exercise of governmental power.
The court, therefore, reinstated the plaintiffs' cause of ac-
tion for inverse condemnation, even though defendant
was unable to exercise the power of eminent domain.3 98
In a holding which may have a far reaching effect on
airport operations in California, the California Supreme
Court held that "[a]irport operations are the quintessen-
tial continuing nuisance, 3 99 and plaintiffs may elect to
treat airport noise and vibrations as either a continuing or
a permanent nuisance. This ruling opens the door for re-
peated lawsuits against airports by the same plaintiffs, be-
cause the statute of limitations for a continuing nuisance
begins to run each time the nuisance occurs.400 In the
case of a permanent nuisance plaintiffs are ordinarily re-
quired to bring one action for all past, present and future
damages within three years after the permanent nuisance
is created.40 1
397 Id. at 863, 705 P.2d at 868, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 295.
Id. at 867, 705 P.2d at 869, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
Id. at 873, 705 P.2d at 873, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
4... Id. at 869, 705 P.2d at 870, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
401 Id.
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